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I. INTRODUCTION
Many scholars of broadcasting regulation describe localism as the "bedrock"
or "keystone" of U.S. broadcasting.' Though the term "localism" is absent
from any major act of broadcast legislation,2 scholars refer to an array of poli-
cies that demonstrate lawmakers' commitment to sustaining or improving upon
the equal distribution of service and local programming among communities.3
Despite the lawmakers' commitment to localism, policy analysis demonstrates
that the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") treatment of the lo-
Adjunct Professor at Clark University. B.A., 1998, Communication, Clark University,
M.S., 2001, Comparative Media Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ph.D.,
2012, Media, Culture, and Communication, New York University. The author thanks Dr.
Ted Magder, Dr. Brett Gary, and Dr. Aurora Wallace for their guidance in the early stages
of the article. Additionally, she is indebted to the editors and staff at CommLaw Conspectus
for their research and editing assistance, which greatly contributed to the article.
I See, e.g., ROBERT L. HILLIARD & MICHAEL C. KEITH, THE QUIETED VOICE: THE RISE
AND DEMISE OF LOCALISM IN AMERICAN RADIO 14 (2005); ROBERT BRTr HORWITZ, THE
IRONY OF REGULATORY REFORM: THE DEREGULATION OF AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
157 (1989).
2 See PHILIP NAPOLI, FOUNDATIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND
PROCESS IN THE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA 204 (2001); see also Harry Cole &
Patrick Murck, The Myth of the Localism Mandate: A Historical Survey of How the FCC's
Actions Belie the Existence of a Governmental Obligation to Provide Local Programming,
15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 339, 340 (2007) ("[T]he concept of localism, as the FCC now
expresses it, has, at best, no more than a marginal and indirect legislative basis.").
3 See Andrew Calabrese, Why Localism? Communication Technology and the Shifting
Scales of Political Community, in COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNITY 241, 253-54 (Gregory
J. Shepherd & Eric W. Rothenbuhler eds., 2001); HILLIARD & KEITH, supra note 1, at 36;
HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 183; NAPOLI, supra note 2, at 204; Sandra Braman, The Ideal v.
the Real in Media Localism: Regulatory Implications, 12 COMM. L. & POL'Y 231, 232
(2007); Cole & Murck, supra note 2, at 341; Tom A. Collins, The Local Service Concept in
Broadcasting: An Evaluation and Recommendation for Change, 65 IOWA L. REv. 553, 566
(1980); Gregory M. Prindle, Note, No Competition: How Radio Consolidation Has Dimin-
ished Diversity and Sacrificed Localism, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 279,
290 (2004).
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calism principle is wavering, ad hoc, and tentative.' Public interest and media
reform groups regularly alert both the public and broadcast stakeholders to
inconsistencies in the FCC's regulation of localism through their activism, re-
search, and publications. Recently, public interest groups have identified media
consolidation as the primary threat to the principle of localism in broadcasting.
Indeed, for over a decade, public interest groups have focused their efforts on
the deregulation of ownership limits, cross ownership restrictions, and the re-
sulting concentration of media ownership.
For example, in 2003, the Prometheus Radio Project, represented by Media
Access Project, challenged the FCC's power to loosen several broadcast own-
ership rules.' In reviewing the FCC's Order taking such action, the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the FCC's power to "regulate media owner-
ship," but found that the order relaxed ownerships limits for local radio and
television, and relaxed cross-media ownership rules, without adequate support.
As such, the court partially remanded the Order, instructing the FCC to modify
or provide additional justification for the amended regulation.'
Following this decision, public interest groups have continued to monitor
the FCC's rule changes following each of its statutorily mandated periodic re-
views.7 In Prometheus II, a coalition of media reform groups challenged the
Commission's 2008 Order relaxing the newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership
ban. Petitioners claimed that the Commission's Order would result in fewer
local news stories and fewer local news sources In response to the Commis-
sion's most recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on media ownership, Pro-
metheus H1 petitioner Free Press claimed, "[r]esearch strongly suggests that, if
4 HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 155; NAPOLI, supra note 2, at 215-16; see Cole & Murck,
supra note 2, at 351.
5 See In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996; Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers; Rules and Poli-
cies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets; Defini-
tion of Radio Markets; Definition of Radio Markets for Areas Not Located in Arbitron Sur-
vey Area, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620 (June
2, 2003); see Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 381-82 (3rd Cir. 2004) [here-
inafter Prometheus I] (questioning the Commission's statutory authority to significantly
relax restrictions on consolidated media).
6 Prometheus 1, 373 F.3d at 382 (remanding for justification or modification, and con-
tinuing a stay for implementation of the rules pending review of the Commission's action).
7 See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431 (3rd Cir. 2011) [hereinafter
Prometheus II]. The FCC must periodically review its ownership rules, so such challenges
may become as regular as each required review. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-104 § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 111-12 (1996).
8 See Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 437-38 (finding that the FCC violated the Administra-
tive Procedures Act by failing to provide ample time to comment on the newspaper-
broadcast cross-ownership ("NBCO") rule and thus vacating and remanding the modified
NBCO rule).
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anything, relaxing the [newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership] rule would lead
to fewer independent sources of local news and is more likely to decrease the
amount of local news at the market level."9
In recent years public interest groups have urged the Commission to adopt
and enforce local programming requirements beyond the obligation to file an
"issues/programs" list each quarter within the mandatory public file." Fur-
thermore, Free Press released a report encouraging the FCC to vigilantly moni-
tor quarterly localism reports filed by Comcast-NBC Universal ("CNBC-U"),
detailing the production and distribution of local news and public affairs pro-
gramming by NBC and Telemundo owned-and-operated stations." In its re-
port, Free Press explained that C-NBCU failed to satisfy the localism condi-
tions pursuant to the terms of the Merger Order, in which the FCC approved
Comcast's acquisition of NBCU. 2 Free Press reports that C-NBCU had not
produced the required additional 1,000 hours per year of locally produced
news and information programming at all of its owned and operated stations.' 3
It also found that the company failed to comply with key aspects of the report-
ing requirements; namely C-NBCU failed to provide a "short description of
[each] program" satisfying the localism commitment. 4 In assessing the case,
Free Press notes, "the FCC bears some blame for failing to require information
that would have enabled the public to better assess whether C-NBCU stations
are airing programming that is responsive to the needs of local communities."' 5
It is clear from the record of reports, comments, and complaints made in re-
cent years that the FCC has failed to satisfy the expectations of citizens, public
interest groups, and academics in its handling of rules affecting the state of
9 In re 2010 Quadrennial Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996; Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting Services, Comments of
Free Press, MB Docket No. 09-182, MB Docket No. 07-294, at 28 (Mar. 5, 2012) [hereinaf-
ter Free Press Quadrennial Review Comments] (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment
Filing System).
10 See In re Broadcast Localism, Reply Comments of Public Interest Public Airwaves
Coalition, MB Docket No. 04-233, at 14-15 (June 11, 2008) (accessible via FCC Electronic
Comment Filing System); see also In re Broadcast Localism, Comments of Public Interest
Public Airwaves Coalition, MB Docket No. 04-233, at 18-20 (Apr. 28, 2008) (accessible via
FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
11 CORIE WRIGHT, FREE PRESS, No NEWS Is BAD NEWS: AN ANALYSIS OF COMCAST-
NBCU COMPLIANCE WITH FCC LOCALISM CONDITIONS 10 (2011), available at
http://commcns.org/YbOgMh.
12 See generally In re Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company
and NBC Universal, Inc; For Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 F.C.C.R. 4238, 4372 (Jan. 18, 2011) (Appendix A,
Localism Conditions).
13 WRIGHT, supra note i1, at 4-6.
14 Id. at 4-5.
15 Id. at 11.
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local broadcasting. Many who acknowledge this situation have not only pur-
sued reformist activities, but also have attempted to explain it. For some, the
FCC's ineffectiveness in enforcing local-programming requirements speaks to
the difficult task of regulating content in a democracy. Due to First Amend-
ment concerns, "[p]olicymakers have failed to reach a stable definition of what
constitutes local programming, which has contributed to the sense of ambiguity
and inconsistency that [has] long characterized localism policymaking."' 6 For
others, an inconsistent approach to managing broadcast localism is simply in-
dicative of a toothless agency. From a broadcaster's perspective, the fact that
"the Commission raises its regulatory eyebrows and huffs and puffs about
some localism obligation" is immaterial when the agency itself has been un-
able or unwilling to define, implement, and enforce such a policy since its ear-
liest days. 7 While the Commission may claim authority, as a regulator, it does
little to effectively promote localism.
A review of analytic work on broadcast localism makes two points clear:
first, scholars agree that localism is foundational to the structure of the U.S.
broadcast system and, second, criticism of the FCC's protection of localism
has circulated throughout rulemaking and enforcement. 8 This article aims to
broaden the discussion of localism policy in American broadcasting by consid-
ering the role and definitions of the localism principle.
Discussion throughout the article also encourages a different interpretation
of the FCC's approach to managing the localism principle. In general, localism
in U.S. policy is consistently mutable. The FCC is one of many governing bod-
ies that must, unenviably, attempt to manage a culturally-celebrated concept
that lacks a legally accepted presence. Looking at the treatment of localism in
different areas of American governance, it is apparent that localism has been
given various meanings and is used at different times for different purposes.
By reading localism as a mutable principle-one that shifts in shape and im-
plementation on a regular basis-the pressing question of regulatory analysis
should not be, whether or not localism is being protected, but which concept of
localism is being protected and under what FCC rules.
To expand on this position, this article examines what may be a resurgence
of localism in the aftermath of the Telecommunication Act of 1996." Starting
in 2000, with the creation of the Low Power FM Radio ("LPFM") license,20 the
16 Philip M. Napoli, The Localism Principle in Communication Policymaking and Pol-
icy Analysis: Ambiguity, Inconsistency, and Empirical Neglect, 29 POL. STUD. J. 372, 373
(2001).
17 Cole & Murck, supra note 2, at 371.
IS Id. at 339-40.
19 See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, Economic and Political Consequences of 1996
Telecommunications Act, 50 HASTINGs L.J. 1359 (1999).
20 Low Power FM Radio, FCC (May 17, 2011), http://commcns.org/WiVwkg.
20121
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
Commission pursued several actions in the name of localism. In addition to
LPFM, the FCC, led by Chairman Michael Powell, initiated a localism pro-
ceeding with the intent to "address behavioral rules that promote localism."'" In
2008, the Commission, chaired by Kevin Martin, followed up on the LPFM
inquiry by releasing a combined Report and Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking as part of the localism proceeding.22
The article begins by exploring theories regarding the establishment of lo-
cally-structured systems, as well as the relationship between theories of local
democratic participation and a system predicated on the local allocation of
spectrum. In turn, the discussion examines the FCC's treatment of the localism
principle, with specific criticism directed toward Congress and the FCC for
what can be considered their failure to meet/accomplish/achieve the democ-
ratic intentions of localism.
This article questions the definitions of localism that underlie the rules for
LPFM service and the proposals of the Localism Proceeding. In order to estab-
lish the validity of this inquiry, this article details the history of localism in
U.S. broadcast regulations as a vaguely defined principle. By highlighting the
inherent ambiguity of broadcast localism, this article will demonstrate that
when discussing codified localism, it is necessary to analyze which definition
of the principle is invoked through policy, including the factors influencing the
activation of a particular form. Thus, this article encourages those interested in
theorizing localism's place in American broadcasting to view the principle not
simply as a regulatory standard, but more so as a provision included for its
symbolic power.
II. ESTABLISHING THEORIES OF LOCAL MEDIA AND THE
DEMOCRATIC ROLE OF LOCAL MEDIA
It is an American tradition to believe in the democratic power of local me-
dia.23 Different in purpose from national media, local news sources are ex-
pected to report on the pressing issues and conditions affecting citizens in the
21 In re Broadcast Localism, Notice of Inquiry, 19 F.C.C.R. 12,425, 5, 7 (June 7,
2004) [hereinafter Broadcast Localism NOI] (seeking comment, specifically, "on how
broadcasters are serving the interests and needs of their communities ... whether market
forces will provide enough incentive for a broadcast station to satisfy a particular policy
goal, or whether regulation is needed.").
22 In re Broadcast Localism, Report on Broadcast Localism and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 1324 (Dec. 18, 2007) [hereinafter Broadcast Localism Report &
NPRM]; Broadcast Localism NOI, supra note 21; see also Broadcast Localism, GARVEY
SHUBERT BARER (Feb. 19, 2008), http://commcns.org/10hu8c3.
23 John W. Whitehead, Why Local Newspapers are the Basis of Democracy, HUFFING-
TON POST (Nov. 11, 2012), http://commcns.org/XGZZ In.
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immediate geographic community.24 It follows that a thriving local press nour-
ishes the political life of the community it serves. Locally-produced news con-
tent about local matters enables "enhanced political participation and better
informed political decision making."25 For this reason, American sociologist
Eric Klinenberg argues, it is crucial that media companies "stake a claim in the
communities where they operate."26 Klinenberg elaborates that when this oc-
curs:
[T]he media contribute to the vitality of local democratic politics by shedding light on
important issues that private citizens do not have the time, inclination, or expertise to
uncover or understand on their own. In the process, local media can provide a forum
from which dissenting voices reach the public, and also help to mediate disputes be-
tween self-interested groups.27
Belief in the democratic potential of circulation of local information is an
American tradition that arguably derives from the ideals of Thomas Jefferson.
Wary of a political system that concentrated authority within the federal gov-
ernment, Jefferson countered the federalist plan for democracy with his notion
of a strong republic. In his essays and letters about the ideal political system,
Jefferson proposed a nation comprised of "little republics"--small counties
granted the authority to rule over the social, political, and economic matters
within its boundaries.29 Jefferson believed that people had a natural right to
self-govemment." Thus, it followed that the federal government should enable
communities to build and sustain themselves by granting them the legal capac-
ity for self-determination." Localities grow in strength as educational, com-
mercial, and legal infrastructures develop. 2 Such is described in a written ex-
change with John Tyler in 1810, in which Jefferson explains the "two great
measures" of his design for a strong republic:
[First, t]hat of general education, to enable every man to judge for himself what will
24 How People Learn About Their Local Community: The Role of Newspapers, JOUR-
NALISM.ORG (Sept. 26, 2011), http://commcns.org/VrxiGm.
25 Philip M. Napoli, Access and Fundamental Principles in Communication Policy,
2002 L. REv. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 797, 801 (citing William Barlow, Community Radio in
the US: The Struggle for a Democratic Medium, 10 MEDIA CULTURE & Soc'Y 81, 102-03
(1988)).
26 ERIC KLINENBERG, FIGHTING FOR AIR: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL AMERICA'S MEDIA 23
(2007).
27 Id.
28 Susan Henderson-Utis, What Would the Founding Fathers Do? The Rise of Religious
Programs in the United States Prison System, 52 How. L.J. 459, 473-74 (2009).
29 See Arthur J. Versluis, The Revolutionary Conservativism of Jefferson's Small Re-
publics, 48 MODERN AGE 6, 9 (2006).
30 THOMAS JEFFERSON, POLITICAL WRITINGS 159-160 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball
eds., 1999).
31 Cf id. (proposing local educational and governmental structures to build "little repub-
lics [which] would be the main strength of the great one.").
32 See id.
20121
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
secure or endanger his freedom. [Second, t]o divide every county into hundreds, of
such size that all the children of each will be in reach of a central school in it. But this
division looks to many other fundamental provisions. Every hundred, besides a
school, should have a justice of the peace, a constable and a captain of militia. These
officers, or some others within the hundred, should be a corporation to manage all its
concerns, to take care of its roads, its poor, and its police by patrols &c. (as the select
men of the Eastern townships). Every hundred should elect one or two jurors to serve
where requisite, and all other elections should be made in the hundreds separately, and
the votes of all the hundreds be brought together. Our present Captaincies might be
declared hundreds for the present, with a power to the courts to alter them occasion-
ally. These little republics would be the main strength of the great one. 3
Focused on the human capacity for rational thought, Jefferson saw self-
government as the supreme and most natural political state." It follows that, for
a decentralized government to thrive, it's citizens' inherent skill for rational
thought must be nurtured by education: "Endowed by their Creator with reason
and an innate moral sense, ordinary mortals-rightly educated and freed from
sophistry, superstition and meddlesome govemment-are capable of achieving
quite extraordinary things."" For Jefferson, ward republics were prime settings
for the cultivation of a vigorous citizenry: youth would be educated within lo-
cal schools and would learn civic participation from their elders, who would
instruct them on how to contribute to the commercial and political health of the
community.36
In addition to Jefferson, a number of political theorists assert that citizens
learn the skills of civic participation at a local level.37 In Carole Pateman's
analysis of John Stuart Mill's model of participatory democracy, she notes that
while Mill agrees with Rousseau "about the educative function of participa-
tion," what distinguishes their theories is Mill's claim that civic education,
which prepares citizens for a participatory role in national politics, exclusively
takes place at the local level.38 Summarizing this important claim appearing in
Considerations on Representative Government, Pateman states:
[Flor Mill, it is at local level where the real educative effect of participation occurs,
where not only do the issues dealt with directly affect the individual and his everyday
life but where he also stands a good chance of, himself, being elected to serve on a lo-
cal body .... It is by participating at the local level that the individual "learns democ-
racy."
3 9
In this account, "participation" at the local level is constituted by the formal
33 Id. at 183.
34 Id. intro., at xxii.
35 Id.
36 See RICHARD D. BROWN, THE STRENGTH OF A PEOPLE: THE IDEA OF AN INFORMED
CITIZENRY IN AMERICA, 1650-1870, at 75-77 (1996); DAVID TYACK, SEEKING COMMON
GROUND: PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 10 (2003).
37 NAPOLI, supra note 2, at 206.
38 CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 30-31 (1970).
39 Id. at 31.
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processes of voting and running for office in a strictly political setting," though
later in his work, Mill considers the significance of democratic exercises
within the workplace, what Pateman describes as "the most interesting aspect
of Mill's theory."'" She explains, "[j]ust as participation in the government of
the collective interest in local politics educates the individual in social respon-
sibility so participation in the management of the collective interest of an in-
dustrial organization [sic] fosters and develops the qualities in the individual
that he needs for public activities." '2 Participating in workplace or union elec-
tions has the same "improving effect" as participating in local government-
both are forms of civic exercises that strengthen the democratic system.
Contemporary scholars make a similar point: Community engagement nur-
tures the public sphere. Whether the focus is social, religious, or political, par-
ticipation in any local group produces that which cultivates civic responsibil-
ity--"social capital."' As Robert Putnam explains, the bond experienced by
participants of local groups, combined with a sense of trust and reciprocity,
sustains a democracy:
[I]n communities that are rich in social capital, civic norms sustain an expanded sense
of 'self-interest' and a firmer confidence in reciprocity. Thus if our stocks of social
capital diminish, more and more of us will be tempted to 'free-ride,' not merely by ig-
noring the appeals to 'viewers like you,' but by neglecting the myriad civic duties that
allow our democracy to work."
Putnam reminds Americans of what they have known by practice since the
early nineteenth century when voluntary associations experienced a growth
spurt. Formed over shared morality or political ideals, early associations often
engendered civic action.
Impressed by these collectives, French historian Alexis de Tocqueville iden-
tified associations as a distinguishing feature of American democracy.
Toqueville was particularly struck by the inclination to assemble in attempts to
reform the law.45 While recognizing the risk of anarchy within systems that
permit free association, he observed, "the most democratic country on earth is
found to be, above all, the one where men in our day have most perfected the
art of pursuing the object of their common desires in common and have applied
40 Id. at 30, 32.
41 Id. at 33.
42 Id. at 34.
43 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 348-49 (2000).
44 Id.
45 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 490 (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Delba Winthrop eds. & trans. 2000) (noting that "the English execute very great things in
isolation, whereas there is scarcely an undertaking so small that Americans do not unite for
it.").
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this new science to the most objects. 46
Analyzing the development of American civic life, sociologist Michael
Schudson argues that voluntary associations played an instrumental role in fos-
tering political involvement in the early nineteenth century and catalyzing the
growth of nascent political parties.47 As many voluntary associations had po-
litical objectives and "borrowed" practices and forms from political life, these
organizations not only served as a model for budding political parties, but also
provided individuals a way to easily bridge their interests with activities in the
political realm. 48 Though the ethical quality of politics during this period was
dubious and largely characterized by patronage, civic engagement was plenti-
ful, often doubling as displays of loyalty to associations and parties.49 Schud-
son argues that the civil service reforms of the Progressive era removed what,
for many, was interesting about civic engagement:
In the lingering demise of patronage, the musculature of American democracy weak-
ened, and the flesh that made the constitutional bones move in synchrony, if only in
certain directions, went slack. Maybe, as the reformers said, the job-hungry parties
had begun to get in the way of truly democratic government in the public interest. At
the same time, weakening the parties, structurally and psychologically, may have left
the public sphere not only cleansed but bleached of the color that had made people
care about it.5"
According to Jefferson, Mill, Tocqueville, Putnam, and Schudson, individu-
als experience the power of localism through the act of association-
congregating to discuss public matters and collectively plan actions.5 These
interactions build trust among community members, inspire civic responsibil-
ity, shield against despotism, and foster democracy.52
It is the responsibility of local media to provide the public with information
46 Id.
47 See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE
98-100 (1998).
48 See id. at 100; see also TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 45, at 181 (outlining the three-step
process by which individuals' associations lead to political involvement: first, an intellectual
bond, next, small gatherings, and, finally, forming a small but separate government inside
the government).
49 SCHUDSON, supra note 47, at 99-103, 131, 187 (detailing the genesis of associations,
the role that their mass appeal played in bolstering loyalties to political parties, and the in-
terestedness and the partiality from which politics suffered).
50 Id. at 155.
51 See, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 367-68 (Thomas
McCarthy ed., William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992) (discussing the collective and
the collaborative nature of these organizations); SCHUDSON, supra note 47, at 108-09 (using
the Boston Female Anti-Slavery society as an example of an association that endeavored to
redefine women's role in political discourse); TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 45, at 496-98 (dis-
cussing the allure of political associations).
52 See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 45, at 485-87, 490 (discussing how "local freedoms"
and the "administration of small affairs" bring citizens closer to one another, despite their
proclivity towards individualism and despotism).
[Vol. 21
Mutability of Broadcast Localism
about local matters, enabling citizens to fulfill their desire for civic engage-
ment. "To be self-governing," according to Professor C. Edwin Baker, "people
require the capacity to form public opinion and then to have that public opinion
influence and ultimately control public 'will formation'-that is government
laws and policies."53 Locally-owned media are most successful at delivering
information that furthers the public's progression toward "will formation,"'54
since local owners "are likely to identify more often with the quality of their
firm's journalistic efforts and the paper or station's service to their communi-
ties.""
II. LOCALISM AS FAIR ALLOCATION IN U.S. BROADCASTING
A. Fair Allocation
The American system of broadcast licensing and regulation affords special
importance to local reporting. 6 The Radio Act of 1912 sought to constrain the
number of amateur transmissions by instituting licensing requirements and
wave length restrictions, thus prioritizing the creation of as many sustainable
broadcast that would serve the towns and cities in which they are located.57
The Radio Act of 1927 ("1927 Act") ordered the Federal Radio Commission
("FRC") to "make such a distribution of licenses, bands of frequency of wave
lengths, periods of time for operation, and of power among the different States
53 C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY: WHY OWNERSHIP MAT-
TERS 7 (2007).
54 Baker appropriates "will formation" from Jirgen Habermas. Compare BAKER, supra
note 53, at 7 (equating "public 'will formation"' to the government's laws and policies), with
HABERMAS, supra note 51, at 5, 38, 77, 103-04 (discussing the importance of community
members' participation in the "will-formation" process).
55 BAKER, supra note 53, at 34. Even without research to support the formula, it is often
assumed that locally owned media are superior at local reporting because they are believed
to possess both a residential expertise and vested interest in the area and people of coverage.
56 See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 557 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("The FCC cannot claim that local coverage lacks special importance. To the
contrary, 'the concept of localism has been a cornerstone of broadcast regulation for dec-
ades."' (quoting In re Broadcast Localism, Report on Broadcast Localism and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 1324, 5 (Dec. 18, 2007))); see also ROBERT W.
MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE FOR THE
CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-35, at 13 (1993) (noting Secretary of Commerce
Herbert Hoover's emphasis that broadcasting regulation should be in the hands of private
actors).
57 ERIK BARNOUW, A TOWER IN BABEL: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED
STATES 32 (1966); SUSAN J. DOUGLAS, INVENTING AMERICAN BROADCASTING 1899-1922, at
234, 236-38 (1987); see also Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, ch. 287, §§ 2-4, 37
Stat. 302, 304 (1912), repealed by Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 39, 44 Stat.
1162, 1174 (1927).
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and communities as to give fair, efficient, and equitable radio service to each
of the same."58 While legislators intended the FRC to fairly allocate resources
among the five zones designated by the Act, they left the specifics of distribu-
tion to the discretion of the FRCY In the debate over provisions of the Act, co-
author of the 1927 Act, Senator Clarence Dill of Washington stated, "[w]e did
not think it wise to require that the [FRC] ... be compelled to give every State
a wave length, because there are some States so located that that might not be
necessary in order to give them fair service.... -6
Soon after its formation, the FRC ran into trouble as litigation arose, claim-
ing violations of the fair allocation requirement.' Additionally, land grant col-
lege stations appealed the FRC's allocation of power and channels, claiming
interference by other stations' broadcasts, a problem that left many of the
highly populated southern states with few stations.62 Representative Ewin
Davis, a Democrat from Tennessee, responded to the educational and nonprofit
stations' plight by proposing an amendment to require the FRC to equally ap-
portion the geographic distribution of power and channels, which became
known as the Davis Amendment.63 Specifically, the Davis Amendment re-
quired the FRC to "make an equal allocation among the five zones, of broad-
casting licenses, of wave lengths, and of station power and provides that within
each zone there should be an equitable allocation among the States thereof in
proportion to population and power."'6 The same year the Davis Amendment
was enacted, the FRC complied with its directive by implementing a new allo-
cation plan, General Order 40."5 Furthering the fair allocation philosophy of the
58 Radio Act of 1927 § 9.
59 Id. § 4(d); see also 67 CONG. REC. 12,618 (1926) (discussing the purpose behind the
1927 Act's enabling the FRC to exercise discretion, when allocating wavelength) (colloquy
between Sens. Willis and Dill).
60 67 CONG REC. 12,618 (1926) (statement of Sen. Clarence Dill).
61 See, e.g., United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 617-18 (N.D. III. 1926)
(affirming a challenge to the FRC's regulations, concluding that the FRC exceeded the
scope of the 1912 Act by imposing time and wavelength restrictions on certain broadcast-
ers); Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that the
Secretary of Commerce lacked the discretion to deny frequency licenses); see also JESSE
WALKER, REBELS ON THE AIR: AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY OF RADIO IN AMERICA 32-33
(2001).
62 GEORGE H. GIBSON, PUBLIC BROADCASTING: THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT, 1912-76, at 10 (1977).
63 Id.
64 69 CONG. REC. 3835 (1928) (statement of Rep. Ewin L. Davis).
65 Contemporary broadcast historians consider General Order 40 an impediment to lo-
calism through the establishment of forty "clear channel" stations. See MCCHESNEY, supra
note 56, at 25-26 (arguing that the "clear channel" policy favored the massive broadcasting
corporations at the expense of the smaller broadcasters); HUGH R. SLOTTEN, RADIO AND
TELEVISION REGULATION: BROADCAST TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1920-1960 47,
51, 53-54 (2000) (noting critics' claims that the FRC was biased against noncommercial
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Davis Amendment, the Communications Act of 1934 mandates that the FCC
"make such distribution of licenses, frequencies, hours of operation, and of
power among the several States and communities as to provide a fair, efficient,
and equitable distribution of radio service to each of the same."
B. Theory One: Fair Allocation, A Result of Amateurs
The United States' locally-oriented, noninterference, private-rights licensing
model stands in stark contrast to the centralized European system, where most
broadcasters are licensed to serve the national community.67 In the first volume
of his history of American broadcasting, Erik Bamouw suggests that Amer-
ica's unique system descends from the informal structure of the pre-regulated
era, which was made up of amateur operating stations in localities throughout
the country. 8 Before the establishment of the Radio Act of 1912, numerous
tinkerers who were driven by personal interest built and operated radio sets,
freely sending Morse Code signals and, in some cases, music. 9 The 1912 Act
introduced to the system new mechanisms for maintaining order, as it required
licensing for all radio operators and confined amateur operators to less desir-
able short waves of less than two hundred meters." However, the influence of
these so-called amateur tinkerers was not lost; radio hobbyists continued to
operate, either on prime wavelengths without a license or legally on a licensed
assignment.7
In the early-twentieth-century, many radio hobbyists practiced early forms
of broadcasting by producing programs consisting of speech and music in-
tended for unknown listeners.72 In January 1921, however, amateur broadcast-
educational broadcasters).
47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (2006).
67 Compare Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast
Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 139, 143, 147, 167, 170 (1990) (noting the American broad-
casting system's emphasis on a distributive private-rights approach to radio broadcasting
regulation), with Russell B. Barber, The European Broadcasting Union, 6 J. BROADCASTING
111, 111-13 (1962) (the purpose of the European broadcasting regulatory authority is to
"obtain 'unification and consolidation of broadcasting in Western Europe as a whole"'), and
Thomas J. Cryan et al., Radio for the 1990s: Legal Strategies in an Emerging Global Mar-
ketplace, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 377, 391 (1991) ("Long governed by Europe's
noncommercial state-run services, the [European regulatory authority] must now cope with
the extraordinary demands of privatization.").
68 See BARNOUW, supra note 57, at 33.
69 See e.g., id. at 29-30, 34; DOUGLAS, supra note 57, at 198, 204; WALKER, supra note
61, at 25.
70 CLINTON B. DESOTO, Two HUNDRED METERS AND DowN: THE STORY OF AMATEUR
RADIO 31,95 (1936).
71 DOUGLAS, supra note 57, at 234, 236.
72 See BARNOUW, supra note 57, at 27, 30, 34 (anecdotally describing the first forms of
radio broadcasting).
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ing was severely curtailed by the Commerce Department, which forbid li-
censed amateurs from broadcasting "weather reports, market reports, music,
concerts, speeches, news, or similar information or entertainments." To adapt,
many who were hobbyists during the early twentieth century started affiliating
with nonprofit organizations or companies that manufactured or sold radio
equipment.74 Although a blow to amateur operations, radio of the early 1920s
sustained the experimental character of the first amateurs:
Opera here, country there, a lot of potted palm music and a little bit of jazz, even a
weekly on-air meeting of a make-believe Keep Growing Wiser Order of Hoot Owls:
early programming was energetic and diverse. The Hoot Owls, merry Masons of Port-
land, Oregon, sounded "as though there was a dandy party going on in the next room
and somebody had left the door open," reported The Wireless Age. "The degree team
is made up of the best wits in town, one merchant, one lawyer, a wholesaler, a piano
dealer, the owner and manager of a booking service and an insurance man; also the
manager of KGW and a goat that is always heard but never seen.75
Though radio lost much of this local flavor once the FRC licensed the bulk
of the broadcast spectrum to the networks, the Radio Act of 1927 preserved the
organically developed structure of amateur broadcasting activity by enacting
an allocation scheme that distributes licenses among communities.6
C. Theory Two: Fair Allocation, A Result of Democratic Theory
Some scholars pose a different explanation for the U.S. system of local li-
censing. These scholars argue that, similar to the way that the Constitution's
postal provision was established in part to cultivate a local press, Congress'
fair allocation mandate was an attempt to establish local broadcasting for de-
mocratic ends.77 The "great, even undue, influence" exerted by electronic me-
dia is "diluted" by distributing broadcast power, through licensing, to many
diverse parties.78 Done to supplement a decentralized political system, this ar-
73 WALKER, supra note 61, at 10.
74 BARNOUW, supra note 57, at 28; see CHRISTOPHER STERLING & JOHN MICHAEL KIT-
TROSS, STAY TUNED: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 45 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing
the radio experimenter, Charles D. "Doc" Herrold, and the career paths available to him and
others in the radio broadcasting field); see also WALKER, supra note 61, at 30 (stating that
amateurs, who failed to expand "their operations into commercial outlets," were effectively
barred from broadcasting).
75 WALKER, supra note 61, at 30 (quoting Hot Hoot Owl Stuff, WIRELESS AGE, May
1924, at 40).
76 The Act empowers the FCC to distribute "licenses, frequencies, hours of operation"
across communities so long as the distribution is "fair, efficient, and equitable." 47 U.S.C. §
307(b) (2006).
77 See, e.g., Braman, supra note 3, at 236-37 (discussing how the Constitution's postal
provisions promoted political discourse); see also HILLIARD & KEITH, supra note 1, at 35;
HORWITZ, supra note I, at 157-58; NAPOLI, supra note 2, at 205-07; Calabrese, supra note 3,
at 251; Collins, supra note 3, at 570.
78 Collins, supra note 3, at 570.
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rangement ultimately results in strengthening the position of localities.79 Thus,
Congress instituted, and the FCC oversaw, "a vague, progressive, almost Jef-
fersonian vision of a democratically communicating local community," be-
stowing local organizations with the legal capacity to broadcast because of a
belief in their ability to speak to and for their communities."
D. Theory Three: Fair Allocation, A Result of Regulatory Rhetoric
This view is by far the most popular explanation for the local structure of
U.S. broadcasting. However, one scholar takes issue with the claim that the
localism doctrine must be attributed to policymakers' regard for Jeffersonian
democracy: "there is in fact almost no evidence that policymakers were harbor-
ing nostalgic fantasies about small town life... ."' In his dissertation explaining
the regulators' intentions behind sustaining broadcast localism, Bill
Kirkpatrick traces discourse within popular, trade, and government texts from
1920-1934, which reveals a cultural, class-based struggle over the moderniza-
tion of the nation. 2 During the early twentieth century, when the world first
began to make sense of radio, the U.S. middle class was in the midst of a bifur-
cation along economic and cultural lines. This resulted in the formation of an
urban, technocratic national class-with sights set on the development of a
national, corporate-industrial economy-and a rural, agrarian middle class. 3
Kirkpatrick demonstrates that localism held "different valences and uses" for
each class.'
While the national class celebrated what Kirkpatrick calls a "positive local-
ism"-the Progressive ideal of community improvement through social and
civic engagement-they criticized the "negative localism" found in rural ar-
eas-a provincial attitude that resisted changes of modernization and urban
culture. 5 The national class opposed "what it perceived as pre-modern resis-
tance to its nationalizing project," reserving its "most pronounced hostility...
for the local middle class that populated the small towns and countryside
throughout the nation." 6 Regulators of the 1920s conceived of radio as part of
a nationalizing project "with the purpose of integrating the pre-modern local
79 Id.
80 HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 186.
81 Bill Kirkpatrick, Localism in American Media, 1920-1934, at 9 (2006) (unpublished
Ph.D dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with CommLaw Conspectus),
available at http://conmcns.org/V8o5Se.
82 See id. at 4.
83 See id. at 82.
84 Id. at 13.
85 d. at 115.
86 Id. at 96.
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into their vision of the modem American nation."87 Kirkpatrick argues that
Hoover, along with his selected fellow Federal Radio Commissioners, insti-
tuted a national radio system, which included a local element that was "a situ-
ational response to political pressures, class divisions, economic ambitions,
and the inherited structures of radio.""8 By the late 1920s, the FRC allocated
most of the spectrum and broadcast power to the national networks, which it
believed to be superior in technical capacity and programming. 9 As an indica-
tion of its political opposition to monopoly, the Commission reserved some
space for outlets of local character, but it effectively marginalized independent
stations by designating substantially less power to them.9° Regulators were
firmly set on "stitching the local into the modem," which they primarily
achieved by
[D]iscouraging local idiosyncrasies and subcultures while encouraging a narrow range
of acceptable programming through acts of both commission and omission in the li-
censing process; enforcing corporate norms of financial and administrative practice
that privileged modem capitalism at the expense of traditional forms of economic ex-
change rooted in informal social networks.9'
Instead of a foundational characteristic of the system, Kirkpatrick demon-
strates that localism was rhetoric appropriated by regulators and corporations
to justify the construction of a national broadcast system.92
III. LOCALISM AS RULES GOVERNING LICENSEE BEHAVIOR
A. Efforts to Protect Local Programming Before Deregulation
It is worth considering localism as having more of a symbolic than infra-
structural presence in the U.S. system. Despite intentions for locally-owned
and operated broadcast stations, due to its commercialism and networks, the
U.S. system has always been a challenging setting for localism.93 Because a
commercial system requires broadcasters to find their own funding and operate
within the parameters of regulatory and marketplace standards,94 licensed
87 Id. at 103.
88 Id. at 192.
89 Id. at 198.
90 Id. at 181-82.
91 Id. at 197.
92 Id. at 182.
93 Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regula-
tion, 60 TEx. L. REV. 207, 208 (1982) (noting that "[b]roadcasting in the United States con-
forms little to the model contemplated in the Commission's licensing philosophy.").
94 In its review of the FCC's decision in FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, the Su-
preme Court held that, "in short, the broadcasting field is open to anyone... if he shows his
competency, the adequacy of his equipment, and financial ability to make good use of the
assigned channel." FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
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broadcasters regularly face scarce technical and financial resources. Spectrum
scarcity is one well-known challenge in broadcasting, but scarce advertising
dollars are just as difficult to manage, and may be the more pressing of the
two.95 A strategy for dealing with high operation costs and scarce sponsorships
is network affiliation, at one time commonly known as "chain broadcasting.'"
By permitting chain broadcasting, the FCC allowed stations to access advertis-
ing money otherwise unavailable, while simultaneously guaranteeing the
dominance of the networks:97
Because there are economies of scale that extend across programs, networks-which
offered an extensive array of pre-packaged programs-made economic sense. By af-
filiating with a network, a local radio licensee could gain access to nationally popular
figures and entertainers whom it had little chance to attract to its studio. By affiliating,
an individual station alleviated much of the need to produce expensive programming
or to seek out and strike individually fashioned contracts with program suppliers.
Network affiliation relieved the local station from some of the burden of attracting
advertisers, since the network centralized this task.98
Despite being good for business, network affiliate contracts impede the
autonomy of local stations by limiting the hours of local programming that
affiliates can air. In 1941, the FCC sought to curb network control over local
affiliates by issuing the Report on Chain Broadcasting, which was accompa-
nied by a set of rules that ordered specific changes to network-affiliate con-
tracts.' The Report concluded that awarding local affiliates greater program-
ming autonomy would better position them "to serve the needs of the local
community by broadcasting such outstanding local events as community con-
certs, civic meetings, local sports events, and other programs of local consumer
and social interest."'" Several years later, the FCC issued its first major policy
95 See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 93, at 221-23.
96 The FCC issued its Chain Broadcasting Rules on May 2, 1941 in part to restrict the
expanding authority of the networks. See Comment, The Impact of the FCC's Chain Broad-
casting Rules, 60 YALE L. J. 78, 78 & n. 1 (1951); see also discussion infra note 97; see gen-
erally Report on Chain Broadcasting, Report and Order, Comm'n Order No. 37, Docket No.
5060 (May 1941), affd, Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
97 Broadcast historians suggest that the development of chain broadcasting enabled the
survival of locally owned stations. By the late 1920s, smaller, regional and local broadcast-
ers were searching for a way to stay alive in an expensive business during a tough economic
period. By joining networks, stations eased the burden of rising operational costs due to the
FRC's increased transmission power standards for local stations and American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers ("ASCAP") royalties, as well as the listening public's
higher expectations for programs. As affiliates, stations were supplied programming and
income from their role as part of a national advertising scheme. See MICHELE HILMES, RA-
DIO VOICES: AMERICAN BROADCASTING, 1922-1952, at 72-73 (1997); SUSAN SMULYAN,
SELLING RADIO: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 1920-1934, at 40-
41(1994).
98 HORwITZ, supra note 1, at 157.
99 See Comment, supra note 96, 78-79.
10o Report on Chain Broadcasting, Report and Order, Comm'n Order No. 37, Docket
20121
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
statement on programming, Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licen-
sees ("the Blue Book"), which complained that broadcasters had "shirked their
responsibilities as local outlets by the extensive use of network programs, tran-
scriptions (recorded music), and wire programs."'"' Concerned that some sta-
tions had become "mere common carriers of program material piped in from
outside the community,"'' 2 the Blue Book further delineated a set of goals for
broadcasters to increase the airing of "local live" and public affairs programs
and to reduce advertising excess.'° The FCC enforced some of these guidelines
with the enactment of the Fairness Doctrine in 1949,"°4 which made license
renewal contingent on a broadcaster's success in meeting two programming
criteria: (1) coverage of controversial issues of interest to the community of
license, and (2) dedicating airtime to the presentation of opposing viewpoints
on controversial issues. 105
The FCC unequivocally refuses to regulate programming, with the exception
of indecent and obscene speech and content targeting children."° Yet, as dem-
onstrated by the Report on Chain Broadcasting and the Blue Book, the Com-
mission has periodically attempted to encourage the production of local pro-
gramming by establishing rules concerning communication between broad-
casters and their communities of license. For example, the FCC initiated the
"main studio" rule in 1939, requiring broadcasters to maintain a primary studio
in its "community of license."'0 7 In hopes of further encouraging public partici-
pation in programming decisions, the "point of origin" rule, adopted in 1950,
required broadcasters to produce a majority of their non-network programming
within the community where its main studio was located.' 8 In 1960, as part of
No. 5060, at 65 (May 1941), aff'd, Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
101 HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 161.
102 FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES 39 (1946).
103 Id. at 55.
104 Context of 1949: FCC Enact Fairness Doctrine, HISTORY COMMONS,
http://commcns.org/SQIfnJ (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
105 47 C.F.R. 73.1910 (1979).
106 See, e.g., In re Development of Policy re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of
Broadcast Stations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 21 (July 28,
1976) (concluding that regulation of program formats was not required by the Communica-
tions Act, nor would it benefit the public, but instead, chill innovation and burden the Com-
mission). More recently, in a letter explaining its decision to grant a particular assignment
application, the Commission emphasized that objections over format change are irrelevant
because "it is well-settled policy that the Commission does not scrutinize or regulate pro-
gramming." Letter from Peter H. Doyle, Media Bureau, FCC, to Counsel for WKCP(FM),
Miami, FL 8 (Mar. 12, 2008) (on file with CommLaw Conspectus), available at
http://commcns.org/WiTVLd.
107 FCC, Rules Governing Standard Broadcast Stations, 4 Fed. Reg. 2699, 2715-16
(1939) (codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 3.12, 3.30-.31 (1939) (repealed)).
los In re Promulgation of Rules and Regulations Concerning the Origination Point of
Programs of Standard and FM Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 43 F.C.C. 570, 570
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a study of network broadcast, the Commission sought to clarify the public in-
terest standard by issuing guidelines for community-responsive program-
ming."° The Commission's En Banc Programming Inquiry set out fourteen
"major elements" it deemed "necessary to the public interest," including "op-
portunity for local self-expression" and "the development and use of local tal-
ent."' " In 1966, the FCC ruled that broadcasters must maintain programming
logs in order to keep the public informed of their efforts at local program-
ming."' Established in 1971, the "community ascertainment" rule required ap-
plicants of broadcast licenses and broadcasters seeking license renewal to re-
search the programming needs of the communities they sought to serve and
issue a formal report of activities to the FCC."2 These rules are evidence of the
regulatory support of local content granted by the FCC.
B. Approach to Local Programming in a Deregulatory Era
Despite its apparent early concern for local programming, the Commission
has since changed course and eliminated many of the rules promulgated to fos-
ter the production of community-responsive programming." 3 These decisions
are part of a lengthy period of deregulation. Rule changes affecting local con-
tent started in the 1980s with the elimination of the "point of origin" and
"community ascertainment" rules based on the rationale that marketplace de-
mand is an adequate incentive for stations to produce locally oriented pro-
gramming."4 Beyond programming rules, the deregulatory era also introduced
(1950).
109 See Report and Statement of Policy Res: Commission en banc Programming Inquiry,
Public Notice, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2303-04 (July 29, 1960).
110 Id. at 2314. Also included in the nonexclusive public interest list were: programs for
children, religious programs, educational programs, public affairs programs, editorialization
by licensees, political broadcasts, agricultural programs, news programs, weather and mar-
ket reports, sports programs, service to minority groups, and entertainment programs. Id.
"' 47C.F.R. §§73.111-.112(1966).
112 In re Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants,
Part I, Sections IV-A and IV-B of FCC Forms, Report and Order, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 14,
17, App. B (Feb. 18, 1971) (providing a revised FCC Primer in Appendix B, specifically
Questions 23 and 24).
"3 David M. Silverman & David N. Tobenkin, The FCC's Main Studio Rule: Achieving
Little for Localism at a Great Cost to Broadcasters, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 469, 477 & n.45
(2001).
114 In re Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Re-
quirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, Report
and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 2 (June 27, 1984). The Commission continues to enforce a
relaxed version of the main studio rule. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1125 (2011). While a station still
is required to keep part of its infrastructure located within the area it is licensed to serve, the
required proximity to the community has changed from "within their principal community
signal contours" to within "the principal community contour of any station in any service
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the relaxation of broadcast station ownership caps. In 1984, the FCC, led by
Mark Fowler, altered the well-known "7-7-7" national multiple ownership
limitation rule (i.e., a national company could not own more than seven AM
stations, seven FM stations, and seven VHF stations) from seven to twelve."5
As part of the change, the FCC introduced a national audience reach restriction
of twenty-five percent."6 Following Fowler's departure from the FCC, deregu-
lation of ownership limits continued, revealing that a policy of deregulation
was firmly in place at the agency." 7 In 1992, the Commission raised national
ownership limits for AM and FM stations to eighteen and ordered the move to
twenty stations in 1994."'
With the passage of further acts of regulatory and statutory deregulation,
consolidation has become more prevalent."9 Likewise, according to media re-
formers and many industry professionals, the state of local ownership in
broadcasting has become increasingly dire. Greatly contributing to this situa-
tion are rule changes tied to the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Congress
eliminated national ownership caps for AM and FM stations, and relaxed own-
ership restrictions in local markets, setting limits according to the size of the
market. 2 ° As for the ownership of television broadcast stations, Congress
licensed to the community of license" or twenty-five miles from the center of the commu-
nity. Silverman & Tobenkin, supra note 113, at 490-91. Also, whereas the older version of
the Rule required a station to originate programs at its main studio, the current version re-
quires that a station's main studio "be capable of originating and transmitting program-
ming." Id. at 486.
115 See In re Amendment of Section 73.3555, [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, and
73.636] of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Televi-
sion Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d. 17, 108-110 (July 26, 1984).
116 Id.; Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating the Federal Communications Commission's
National Television Ownership Cap: What's Bad for Broadcasting is Good for the Country,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 446 (2004).
117 See Rachel M. Stilwell, Which Public? Whose Interest? How the FCC's Deregulation
of Radio Station Ownership Has Harmed the Public Interest, and How We Can Escape from
the Swamp, 26 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 369, 370-371 (2006).
118 In re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 2755, 12
(Mar. 12, 1992) (originally raising the national ownership limit to 30 FM and 30 AM sta-
tions); In re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Memorandum Opinion and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 6387, 13-14 (Aug. 5, 1992) (amend-
ing the national ownership rule to permit a single entity to own or have an attributable inter-
est in only 18 AM and 18 FM stations, and after two years, increasing that limit to 20 AM
and 20 FM stations).
1"9 Stilwell, supra note 117, at 371.
120 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(b)(1), 110 Stat. 56,
110 (1996) ("(A) in a radio market with 45 or more commercial radio stations, a party may
own, operate, or control up to 8 commercial radio stations, not more than 5 of which are in
the same service (AM or FM); (B) in a radio market with between 30 and 44 (inclusive)
commercial radio stations, a party may own, operate, or control up to 7 commercial radio
stations, not more than 4 of which are in the same service (AM or FM); (C) in a radio mar-
ket with between 15 and 29 (inclusive) commercial radio stations, a party may own, operate,
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eliminated numerical limits pertaining to the national market, and raised the
audience reach limitation to thirty-five percent.' Although it did not specify
changes to ownership limits in local markets, it ordered the FCC to conduct
rule-making proceedings to determine how the duopoly rules should be modi-
fied.'22 With regard to cross-ownership, Congress relaxed the one-to-a-market
rule by waiving it for owners in the top fifty markets, and also allowed for an
entity to own both a broadcast network and cable system.'23 In general, the
Telecommunications Act allowed media companies to expand and engage in
cross-platform competition. A number of scholars and citizens groups perceive
the Telecommunications Act as a display of government's disloyalty to local-
ism. In support of this claim, they point to statistics showing the decline of
locally owned and produced broadcast and print media following its enact-
ment, as well as anecdotal evidence indicating that having fewer local media
sources harms the quality of information that citizens encounter in the public
sphere.'24
III. REASONS FOR AMBIGUITY IN FCC LOCALISM REGULATION
A. "Informal Mode of Rulemaking"
The preceding discussion shows that the FCC's approach to managing local-
ism is ambivalent and inconsistent. One explanation for such treatment is that
ambiguity is inherent in the nature of government regulation. In other words,
an ambivalent approach to managing localism does not reflect the strength of
the principle, but rather it is typical behavior of a government agency. Horwitz
explains that agencies practice an "informal mode of rulemaking" in which
commissioners weigh the positions of interested parties on matters in their ju-
risdiction, hearing from stakeholders-largely industry-and experts, and ar-
rive at rules to address the situation. 25 Noting that the authority of agencies is
or control up to 6 commercial radio stations, not more than 4 of which are in the same ser-
vice (AM or FM); and (D) in a radio market with 14 or fewer commercial radio stations, a
party may own, operate, or control up to 5 commercial radio stations, not more than 3 of
which are in the same service (AM or FM), except that a party may not own, operate, or
control more than 50 percent of the market."); Silverman & Tobenkin, supra note 113, at
489 (noting that "the Telecommunications Act of 1996 led to a significant easing of the
ownership limitations on radio and television stations, allowing ownership of as many as
eight radio stations within a single market.").
121 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(c).
122 Id. § 202(c)(2).
123 Id. § 202(d)-(e).
124 See NAPOLI, supra note 2, at 222-24; WRIGHT, supra note II, at 2; Todd Chambers,
Radio Programming Diversity in the Era of Consolidation, 10 J. RADIO STUD. 33, 35 (2003).
125 HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 48.
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"discretionary," Horwitz states, "the agency bargains with the principal con-
tending parties. 26 The open-ended and vague, often contradictory mandate
Congress gives to the agency in its enabling legislation tends to exacerbate this
dynamic of discretionary bargaining over specific policies. Consequently, few
clear or steadfast policies are formulated or followed.' 27 The FCC, as an
agency of the New Deal era, was introduced to control entry into broadcasting
and price-and-entry into telecommunications before an era of deregulation.'
28
Horwitz argues the FCC applied distinct approaches to managing licensee be-
havior and spectrum allocation:
[T]he Commission never formulated clear-cut policies or rules with regard to licensee
behavior, the awarding of broadcast licenses, or network-affiliate relations (including
station ownership limits). Conversely, where the FCC did enact formal rules-in
spectrum allocation-the Commission stuck steadfastly to a fundamentally flawed
and inadequate plan. The history of FCC regulatory activity in the area of broadcast-
ing illuminates the two basic, dialectically interrelated problems of regulation: bar-
gaining in ad hoc adjudication proceedings and inflexibility of formal rule making. 29
In an effort to fulfill its mandate to protect the vaguely-defined "public in-
terest," the FCC firmly maintained the preexisting structure of fair allocation
that accommodated the networks, while simultaneously limiting its rulemaking
so as not to get in the way of licensees serving their local communities. 30
Though ad hoc adjudication resulted in contradictory methods to managing use
of broadcast spectrum, Horwitz's point is that seemingly contrary pursuits are
neither atypical of, nor harmful to, the FCC. Rather they are characteristic of
the behavior of government agencies. Affected by budgetary decisions and
subject to congressional control, the FCC must balance the frequently compet-
ing interests of industry and the public, all the while answering to the White
House and Congress. The resulting political pressure and its shifting interests
have both contributed to the FCC's inconsistent policy direction.' Addition-
ally, the regular turnover of commissioners at the FCC exacerbates the already
unpredictable environment of decision making.' These unstable and varying
institutional conditions provide one explanation for the FCC's varying treat-
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 70, 72.
129 Id. at 155.
130 Ultimately, Horwitz argues, such "paradoxical" activity ended up stunting the devel-
opment of FM radio, broadcast television, and cable, and led to an inefficient use of the
spectrum, inspiring calls for deregulation from groups across the political broad, including
leftist public interest groups and conservative, capitalist economists. See generally HOR-
WITZ, supra note 1.
131 ERWIN G. KRASNOw, LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & HERBERT A. TERRY, THE POLITICS OF
BROADCAST REGULATION 41-42 (3d ed. 1982).
132 See id. (explaining that, although often criticized as though it were a static institution,
the Commission has to accommodate its different leaders at different times, each "with di-
vergent opinions as to how broadcasting should be regulated").
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ment of local programming.
B. Capture Theory
A slightly different way to explain the FCC's inconsistent approach to regu-
lating localism is to examine the Commission's role within a commercial
broadcast system. More than a few critics doubt the FCC's ability to regulate
in the public interest, claiming the FCC's role is "captured" by industry.'33 The
vulnerability of FCC commissioners bending to industry's will is explained by
some as merely ideological, but more often, critics attribute signs of capture to
material enticements, such as future "high-paying jobs in the companies they
once regulated."' 34
C. Localism is Inherently Uncertain in the U.S. Political System
A third approach to interpreting the FCC's ad hoc management of localism
is to examine the nature of localism as a principle itself. There is an innate
characteristic to localism's character that lends itself to uncertainty. " Beyond
communications law, a survey of localism in American governance exposes
this legal principle's unstable presence. Localism, meaning the self-
government of U.S. localities, is not explicitly provided for by federal or state
constitutions.'36 Over time, however, localism as a value has become "deeply
embedded in the American legal and political culture.""' As a matter of law,
local governments are "solely creatures of state government," existing "only at
the sufferance of state authority."'' Despite their subordinate status, states
133 See HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 29 ("[A] captured agency systematically favors the
private interests of regulated parties and systematically ignores the public interest."). But see
KRASNOW, LONGLEY & TERRY, supra note 133, at 49 ("To some critics the Federal Commu-
nications Commission seems 'captured' by the broadcast industry. While there may have
been times when that assertion was true, it now seems to be off target.").
134 KRASNOW, LONGLEY & TERRY, supra note 133, at 50-51 (explaining the "revolving
door" relationship between the FCC and those entities subject to its regulation. For instance,
"of sixteen FCC Commissioners who left the agency between 1961 and 1975, four accepted
subsequent employment in regulated industries.").
135 Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1990) (discussing the theory that local government have limited
legal powers).
136 Id. at 7 (defining "localism" in terms of "local power" and "local self-
determination"). The author acknowledges Philip Napoli's annotated bibliography on local-
ism as directing her attention to Briffault's article. See PHILIP M. NAPOLI, THE LOCALISM
PRINCIPLE IN COMMUNICATIONS POLICYMAKING: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (Aug.
2004), available at
http://commcns.org/UxhnoM.
137 Briffault, supra note 135, at 1.
138 Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 632 (2001).
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have granted local governments autonomy over public services within their
boundaries, including those of safety, education, and property.'39 "Localism" is
thus the power of local governments to exercise authority over such matters
through regulation and funding through local taxes, and to protect that local
system from state displacement.'40 As one scholar points out, localities are fre-
quently given these responsibilities without the accompanying legal authority
to raise the revenues necessary to fund these endeavors."' 4 ' States can expect to
win legal challenges to local authority in cases where they have not granted
local governments the authority to autonomously institute municipal law.'
Additionally, all local governments are subject to the doctrine of implied pre-
emption, under which state statutes are held to preempt local laws "where there
are suitable practical reasons to maintain comprehensive state regulation.' 43 In
these cases, issues concerning whether and to what extent local laws are impli-
edly preempted by state laws are determined by a judicially created set of stan-
dards. 44 Therefore, implied preemption "does not give one confidence that
local interests will be suitably protected.' 45 Ultimately, localism, as a formal
power, is provisional.
Although it is primarily a matter of state permission and judicial discretion,
localism also refers to the acts of citizens exercising their civic rights by
mechanisms of "direct democracy."' 46 Through methods of lawmaking-
initiative, popular referendum, and recall-citizens participate directly in the
process by voting on ballot measures. 47 The practice of direct democracy is not
a modern concept. Colonists practiced an early version of the initiative in New
England town meetings by "plac[ing] proposed ordinances or other questions
on the agenda by petition, meet[ing] and discuss[ing] the proposals, and then
vot[ing] to accept or reject them.' 48 During the American Revolution, a num-
139 Briffault, supra note 135, at 19 & n.59 (citing ROBERT L. LINEBERRY, EQUALITY AND
URBAN POLICY: THE DISTRIBUTION OF MUNICIPAL PUBLIC SERVICES 10 (1977)).
140 See Briffault, supra note 135, at 19.
141 Rodriguez, supra note 138, at 638.
142 Id. at 638 (citing Sho Sato, Municpal Affairs in California, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1055
(1972)).
143 Id. at 639.
144 Id. at 639-640.
14 Id. at 640.
146 Daniel A. Smith & Joseph Lubinski, Direct Democracy During the Progressive Era:
A Crack in the Populist Veneer?, 14 J. POL'Y HIST. 349, 374 n.2 (2002).
147 Id. ("With the initiative, citizens collect a specified number of valid signatures in
order to place either a statutory measure or a constitutional amendment on the ballot for
fellow voters to adopt or reject. With the popular referendum, citizens petition their legisla-
tures to place a disputed legislative action on the ballot for the voters to reconsider. The
recall enables citizens to collect signatures to force a retention vote of an elected official.").
148 DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION 4
(1989).
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ber of states institutionalized the idea of voter ratification of state constitutions,
thereby providing a similar mechanism for citizen lawmaking.' During the
Progressive Era, there was widespread interest in operationalizing devices of
direct democracy at a municipal level as part of the effort to both eradicate cor-
ruption of state and city governments and ameliorate the accountability of local
political officials. As Earnest Griffith explains, "Progressivism set out to re-
form the cities and make them honest, responsive, efficient, and humane."'' 0
Furthermore, Griffith states, "[t]here was substantial consensus among these
early reformers that cities should be autonomous with regard to their charters
and powers." ''
By the late nineteenth century, industrialism, and the resulting rapid growth
of urban populations, had concentrated wealth and voter power within cities."2
Citizens regularly faced the disappointment of state authority, especially where
the state failed to provide cities with requested legislation.'53 At times, state
legislators pursued unsolicited intervention in local affairs to gain voter and
corporate support.'54 There was also corruption among city officials, who un-
scrupulously profited from the awarding of contracts for public utilities and
other services." To rectify the inefficiency of state intervention and the cor-
ruption of city officials, progressive state legislators used their power to pro-
mote municipal reform through a number of devices. One such device was the
introduction of Initiative and Referendum ("I&R") to state constitutions by
amendment or by state law allowing cities to adopt I&R in their charters. 6
Another mechanism used to reform municipalities was "home rule," where
states granted cities the right to institute municipal law without subjection to
state approval.' Richard Briffault describes two home rule provisions:
The original form of home rule amendment treated the home rule municipality as an
imperium in imperio, a state within a state, possessed of the full police power with re-
149 Id.
150 ERNEST S. GRIFFITH, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT: THE PROGRES-
SIVE YEARS AND THEIR AFTERMATH, 1900-1920, at 34 (1974).
151 Id.
152 See CHARLES N. GLAAB & A. THEODORE BROWN, A HISTORY OF URBAN AMERICA
133-34 (1967).
153 See id. at 187; Wallace S. Sayre & Nelson W. Polsby, American Political Science and
the Study of Urbanization, in THE STUDY OF URBANIZATION 115, 123-24 (Philip M. Hauser
& Leo F. Schnore eds., 1965) (discussing municipal reform efforts of the 1890s which
sought "home rule" for city governments and to "restrict the powers of state legislatures to
enact special legislation affecting cities").
14 Cf Briffault, supra note 135, at 13 ("Special laws were usually drafted by local inter-
ests, handled at the state level by legislaors from the locality affected and enacted by the
legislature unamended.").
155 DAVID BERMAN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES: AUTONOMY, POLITICS, AND
POLICY 55-56 (2003).
156 See SCHMIDT, supra note 148, at 5-10.
157 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (9th ed. 2009).
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spect to municipal affairs and also enjoying a correlative degree of immunity from
state legislative interference. When courts encountered difficulties distinguishing
"municipal affairs" from matters of state concern, a second model was developed that
sought simply to broaden local lawmaking authority without attempting to erect a wall
against state laws on local matters.1
58
Progressives presumed that there would be several benefits to states granting
local citizens further autonomy over their cities. In addition to heightening the
capacity of citizens to hold political representatives accountable, it was be-
lieved that the greater sense of responsibility placed on local citizens would
result in increased civic pride and stronger community." 9 Progressives pre-
sumed that, if faced with the duty of choosing leaders and policies that affect
their immediate surroundings, city residents would turn to each other for aid in
sorting through matters of public affairs and in discovering the common
good."W To illustrate such thinking, Ernest Griffith quotes a spokesman for the
Federated Improvement Association of Cincinnati, where he observes that "it
is in cities that men, if given the chance of home rule, will learn most[] quickly
the true foundation principles on which rests real freedom in representative
democracy."'' Citing similar excerpts of Progressive rhetoric, Griffith demon-
strates that, during the early twentieth century, forms of local power were as-
sociated with morality, safety, honesty, and the public interest.'62
Even with the home rule achievements of the Progressive era, it is clear that
158 Briffault, supra note 135, at 10 (footnote omitted).
159 See DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE: THE EF-
FECTS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AMERI-
CAN STATES 53 (2004). Quoting a United States Senator representing Oregon, Jonathan
Bourne, Jr., Smith and Tolbert illustrate the Progressive attitude toward the initiative and
referendum system:
The system encourages every citizen ... to study the problems of government, city and
state, and to submit whatever solution he may evolve for the consideration and ap-
proval of others. The study of the measures and arguments printed in the publicity
pamphlet is of immense educational value. The system not only encourages the devel-
opment of each individual, but tends to elevate the entire electorate to the plane of
those who are most advanced. How different from the system so generally in force,
which tends to discourage and suppress the individual!
Id. (citation omitted).
160 See Briffault, supra note 135, at 89 (discussing local government and its response to
local demands).
161 GRIFFITH, supra note 150, at 117.
162 Id. at 117. The full quote from the Federated Improvement Association of Cincinnati
spokesman follows:
Cities are playing a more and more important part in the life of the nation.., in cities
men have many interests in common to all, such as the use of the streets, police, fire
and health protection .... [There men] learn best how to work together, learn best the
great truth that each must give up something for the good of all ... it is in cities that
men, if given the chance of home rule, will learn mostly quickly the true foundation
principles on which rests real freedom in representative democracy.
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federal law does not guarantee local power. David Berman emphasizes this
point by reminding readers of the structural vulnerability of localism with a
colorful excerpt from Judge Dillon, who, while serving as a federal judge, au-
thored the reigning rule for municipalities' relationship to states:
There is no doubt about the formal legal status of the approximately 87,000 units of
local government in this country: they are at the bottom of the hierarchy of govern-
ment, at the mercy of the states. To quote from the highly respected nineteenth-
century authority on municipal law, Judge John F. Dillon, who did not mince words:
"Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly
from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they can-
not exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and control.
... We know of no limitation of this right so far as corporations themselves are con-
cemed. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature. 163
Given the statutory limits of local government, localism is "largely a product
of institutional arrangements and political values.'"" Even so, in certain mat-
ters, these arrangements wield just as much power as any state statute. Such is
the argument of Richard Briffault in his challenge to Gerald Frug's claim that
the courts are eroding local power. 65 Briffault demonstrates that, in cases con-
cerning school finance and exclusionary zoning legislation within suburbs,
courts have ruled in favor of local power.'" For about a decade, starting in the
late 1960s, state courts throughout the country would hear cases brought
against localities over school finance and zoning laws. 67 In these cases, the
plaintiffs' general contention was that these laws promoted inequality among
communities:
These two reform campaigns were pursued in the name of equality and their goals
were interrelated. School finance reform would sever the link between local wealth
and the quality of local education by having the states assume a greater degree of fi-
nancial responsibility for public schools. Reducing the local role in school financing
would ease local tax burdens and reduce the fiscal incentive to zone out lower-income
residents. The attack on exclusionary zoning was aimed at opening up the suburbs to
less expensive housing and thus to less affluent people. The economic integration of
the suburbs would mitigate interlocal disparities in taxable wealth and public ser-
vices. 168
Plaintiffs argued that states must assume their rightful authority over local
governments by altering laws in order to protect the rights of all citizens. 69 In
the vast majority of cases, the court ruled in favor of local law, 7 upholding
local government's authority to manage and fund education, property, and de-
163 BERMAN, supra note 155, at 2 (quoting City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and Mo.
River R.R., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868)).
164 Briffault, supra note 135, at 91.
165 Id. at 1059-60
166 Id. at 3.
167 Id. at 23.
168 Id.
169 See id. at 24-25, 27.
170 Id. at, 25 (footnotes omitted).
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velopment, agreeing with the defendant states to treat it not as a creature of the
state, but as a "representatives of local residents, making local public policy on
behalf of its local constituents."'' For the most part, the same is true for state
legislatures; in reform efforts to equalize school funding by way of legislating
state aid, states continue to respect the fiscal autonomy of localities in order to
fund education at their discretion.'7 In attempts to control the development of
land impacting the environment (i.e., beyond the host locality), states have lim-
ited their authority by a number of measures, such as permitting host localities
to retain initial controls over land and providing them with the power to reject
development proposals. 17
An idea reflected in the title of his article, "Our Localism," Briffault claims
that the logic behind the legislative and judicial practices of arranging law to
protect local autonomy is America's ideological commitment to localism.'74 It
is the "ideological strength of localism" that allows the principle to be "tacit or
de facto"'175 and, at the same time, exercise a dominant institutional presence. 76
According to Briffault, the problem with this arrangement, which lacks a con-
stitutional foundation and is propped up by ideology, is that it has not been
subjected to a formal evaluation of its goals, effects, and externalities, which
has resulted in the promotion of "interlocal inequality."' 77
In school finance cases, courts rejected reformist proposals for state-
imposed spending caps on education or arrangements for wealthier districts to
pay aid to poorer districts, citing provisions of home rule that allow local gov-
ernments to allocate funds at their discretion.'78 In cases of local land use plan-
ning, courts upheld practices of exclusionary zoning. These practices effec-
tively prevented lower-income families from taking up residence within the
localities in question, which allowed localities to preserve the "local status quo
in the community" by controlling growth and maintaining community re-
sources.'79 Based on these cases, Briffault observes:
The same legal authorizations and restrictions may add up to real power for one set of
local entities but provide only the illusion of power for the others .... [T]he differ-
ences in local needs and conflicts among local interests make the very concept of local
power as a general matter, considered apart from the situations of particular local gov-
ernment and people, inherently ambiguous. 8'
171 Id. at 23.
172 See id. at 59 n.257.
173 See id. at 3-4.
174 Id. at 1-2.
17 Id. at 114..
176 Id. at 114.
177 See id. at 112.
178 Id. at 28-32.
179 Id. at 44-46.
180 Id. at 114.
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The legal practice of ambiguous localism has led to disparity, attitudes of
provincialism, and social tension among communities.' For Briffault, these
problematic consequences justify state action to broaden the scope of lawful
authority over localities in order to promote equal protection.'82
Legal scholars demonstrate that, within United States law, localism lacks
consistent structure, and the meaning of localism shifts depending on the char-
acteristics of a community.'83 Multiple definitions of the principle of localism
have been theorized over time.'8 It appears that the most stable aspect of local-
ism is its mutability.
IV. BROADCAST LOCALISM POST 1996
Media policy scholars argue that the FCC mostly fails to promote localism,
first, by neglecting to adopt firm criteria to define localism, and second, by
neglecting to establish strict rules to implement its definition.'85 This perspec-
tive rests on the belief that policymakers introduced localism to the system of
broadcasting by way of a decentralized structure of local licensing for the pur-
pose of democratic ends.8 6 However, despite being an ideologically powerful
concept rooted in American political tradition, broadcast localism's strength is
questionable given its unsteady record. As within municipal law, the meaning
of localism in broadcast regulation shifts with the political and social context.
For example, in the 1920s, localism represented community (and particularly,
rural) autonomy; 87 in the 1940s, localism was synonymous with community
programming;"' in the 1980s, the principle was associated with the improved
financial standing of stations.'89
Due to the lack of certainty about localism, there is an analytic need to inter-
's See id. at 1-2, 5-6, 14, 18-19, 21, 50-51, 58.
182 Id. at 7-8, 113.
183 See id. at 4-5, 51, 57-58, 75-77; Rodriguez, supra note 138, at 627.
184 Rodriguez, supra note 138, at 627, 632-34 (summarizing legal scholarship character-
izing localism).
'85 See NAPOLI, supra note 2, at 215 ("Clearly, localism policymaking has suffered from
severe ambiguity in terms of what exactly constitutes local programming. This operational
ambiguity hinders coherent and consistent policymaking, as the evaluative criteria are con-
stantly shifting."); Cole & Murck, supra note 2, at 341; Collins, supra note 3, at 555-56.
186 See supra Part II.
187 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part Il-Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 346, 359-61 (1990) (discussing suburban growth and the incorporation of
communities with "suburban character"); see also id. at 372 (discussing the impact of the
widespread adoption of zoning laws).
188 See Akilah N. Folami, Deliberative Democracy on the Air: Reinvigorate Localism-
Resuscitate Radio's Subversive Past, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 141, 154-55 (2010) (examining the
adoption of the FCC's Chain Broadcasting Order and the Main Studio rule).
189 See id. at 183-84 (explaining how deregulation during the 1980s led to increased
ownership of radio stations by conglomerates who consolidated stations to increase profits).
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rogate the meaning of localism in every case of its mention. When it is intro-
duced into political debate and efforts are made to codify the principle, it is
necessary to examine which definition of the principle is invoked and to con-
sider the reasons behind its introduction. I adopt this approach in exploring the
Commission's localism pursuits during the years following the passage of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("the Act").
One consequence of the Telecommunications Act was a rapid consolidation
of radio companies. Despite the Act's stated purpose of promoting a more
competitive market, the Act significantly reduced the number of competitors in
radio:
There were more than 10,400 commercial radio stations in the United States when the
Telecom Act went into effect in 1996. During the two-year industry-wide shopping
spree that followed the relaxed regulations, media companies bought and sold more
than 4,400 of them, over 40 percent of the field, reducing the number of individual
owners by 700 (or about 14 percent).190
By spring 2002, the ten largest national radio companies controlled two-
thirds of the market share, and 40 percent belonged to the two largest compa-
nies-Clear Channel and Viacom.' 9'
With national radio companies doing most of the buy-outs, local ownership
dropped considerably: "[I]n almost every metropolitan area, the four largest
firms together had over 70 [percent] market share," and "[t]hat figure generally
exceeded 90 [percent] in smaller markets."'9' Often, the sale of a local station
to a national company was followed by a format change, the introduction of
new on-air personalities, and less airtime for information that is location-
specific.'93 Behind the scenes, main studios were vacated, local personnel were
fired, and distribution networks were established in order to air centralized
programming on stations throughout the country. 194
190 KLINENBERG, supra note 26, at 27.
191 Peter DiCola, Employment and Wage Effects of Radio Consolidation, in MEDIA DI-
VERSITY AND LOCALISM: MEANING AND METRICS 57, 59 (Philip M. Napoli ed., 2007) (citing
PETER DICOLA & KRISTIN THOMPSON, FUTURE OF MUSIC COAL., RADIO DEREGULATION: HAS
IT SERVED CITIZENS AND MUSICIANS 18 (2002), available at http://commcns.org/Va 1KY6.
192 Id. (citing PETER DICOLA & KRISTIN THOMPSON, FuruRE OF MUSIC COAL., RADIO
DEREGULATION: HAS IT SERVED CITIZENS AND MUSICIANS 18 (2002), available at
http://commcns.org/Val KY6).
193 Cf. PETER DICOLA & KRISTIN THOMPSON, FUTURE OF MUSIC COAL., RADIO DEREGU-
LATION: HAS IT SERVED CITIZENS AND MUSICIANS 18 (2002), available at
http://commcns.org/ValKY6 (listing the author's concerns with "oligopoly power in radio":
less focus on consumers; higher advertising prices; concentrated control of information; and
less access and less leverage for musicians).
'94 DiCola, supra note 191, at 61; KLINENBERG,,supra note 26, at 27; Nina Huntemann,
Corporate Interference: The Commercialization and Concentration of Radio Post the 1996
Telecommunications Act, 23 J. COMM. INQUIRY 390, 401 (1999); Michael J. Aguilar, Note,
Micro Radio: A Small Step in the Return to Localism, Diversity, and Competitiveness in
Broadcasting, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1133, 1168-69 (1999); Arthur Martin, Comment, Which
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Such changes did not resonate well with several groups, including listeners
who lost their beloved local radio station, citizen organizations who recognized
a general weakening of the public interest in local affairs, and radio profes-
sionals who lost their employment at local stations due to ownership changing
hands. By the end of the decade, the FCC was aware of the dissatisfaction over
the changes to radio.9 ' In response to criticism that it was not safeguarding the
public interest, the Commission initiated a series of actions in an effort to
strengthen the seemingly endangered broadcast localism.'96 In January 2000,
the FCC established LPFM service after receiving thousands of complaints
over the effects of radio company consolidation.'97 In preparation for the new
license, Chairman William Kennard justified LPFM service as one solution to
what he termed the "unprecedented feeding frenzy":
The jury is still out whether consolidation will be in the long run better for consumers.
But we know one of the immediate impacts is that it's harder for smaller businesses
and less conventional broadcasters to get access to the airwaves. Low-power FM is a
counter-insurgency, an effort to give the airwaves back to local communities in ways
that allow local voices-musicians, churches, non-profits, community groups, minor-
ity companies, small business-to speak to their communities.'98
After a yearlong period of hearing comments and weighing positions on the
service, the Commission created a noncommercial, low-power radio license for
local, nonprofit organizations that resulted in the introduction of over 800 sta-
tions to the airwaves. '99
A few years after the establishment of LPFM service, Chairman Michael
Powell announced his decision to launch a "localism in broadcasting" initiative
consisting of a three-prong effort.2" The initiative includes the accelerated ac-
tivation of LPFM stations, the creation a Localism Task Force to study the
topic and conduct public hearings, and delivery of a Notice of Inquiry on local-
Public, Whose Interest? The FCC, the Public Interest, and Low-Power Radio, 38 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1159, 1160-62 (2001); Prindle, supra note 3, at 316.
195 Aguilar, supra note 194, at 1167-68.
196 Id. at 1172-74.
197 Low Power FM Broadcast Radion Stations (LPFM), FCC ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://commcns.org/l ICc50A (last visited Jan. 7, 2013). The Low Power FM (LPFM)
stations are only for noncommercial educational broadcasting and operate with an effective
radiated power (ERP) of 100 watts or less. LPFM is not for commercial purposes. We Won!
Senate Joins House in Passing the Local Community Radio Act!, PROMETHEUS RADIO PRO-
JECT, http://commcns.org/W9b75n (last visited Jan. 7, 2013).
198 Greg Kot, Micro Waves: It's 1,000-watt Radio Stations Versus Thousands of Corpo-
rate Stations in a Lopsided Battle for the Airwaves, CHI. TRIB, (Oct. 20, 1999),
http://commcns.org/WaSVt4.
199 In re Creation of Low Power Radio Service, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 2205, I
(Jan 20, 2000) [hereinafter LPFM Report and Order]; see also PROMETHEUS RADIO PROJECT,
supra note 197.
200 Press Release, FCC, FCC Chairman Powell Launches "Localism in Broadcasting"
Initiative (Aug. 20, 2003), available at http://commcns.org/V8nnnP.
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ism."' In the Commission's press release on the initiative, Powell provided an
explanation for his decision: "[W]e heard the voice of public concern about the
media loud and clear. Localism is at the core of these concerns.""2 2 Addition-
ally, Powell noted recent Senate Commerce Committee hearings that high-
lighted the recognition of the "issue of localism in broadcasting."2 3 As part of
the localism endeavor, the FCC held public hearings on broadcast localism in
five states-Maine, North Carolina, Texas, South Dakota, and California-and
Washington, DC, providing citizens the opportunity to share their experiences
with local broadcasting directly with commissioners.2" Additionally, as prom-
ised, in 2004 the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry on Broadcast Local-
ism.20
5
The rest of this article addresses the significance of LPFM service and the
Localism Proceeding. Feeling pressure from citizen groups, members of the
public, and members of Congress, the FCC made efforts to address what in-
vested parties claimed to be a blatant lack of broadcast localism.2" In the
meantime, the Commission ensured that it addressed the interests of the broad-
cast industry and the constraints of the regulatory system. 27 How did the FCC
do this? What kind of localism did the FCC promote within the system follow-
ing the enactment of the Telecommunications Act? Why did the FCC select
this form of localism during this period? By considering these questions, this
article attempts to comment on the shapes of localism that are currently rele-
vant and the precarious line that the FCC walks when managing matters con-
cerning the public interest.
A. Low Power FM as a Conduit for Localism
Since the establishment of LPFM service in 2000, the FCC and political
leaders have deemed localism as the rationale behind its existence. In her
statement on the Report & Order that creates LPFM service, Commissioner
Gloria Tristani declared that the LPFM order "promotes localism and diversity
not by limiting the rights of existing voices, but by adding new voices to the
mix."2 Similarly, in his statement on the proposed Low Power Radio Act of
2004, for which he was one of the primary sponsors, Senator John McCain
201 Frank James, FCC Orders Study on Media 'Localism': Embattled Chief Tunes in to
Critics, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 21, 2003), http://commcns.org/VMGw0Y.
202 Press Release, FCC, supra note 200.
203 Id.
204 See Broadcast Localism NOI, supra note 21, 6.
205 Broadcast Localism NOI, supra note 21.
206 See Press Release, FCC, supra note 200.
207 See generally id.
208 LPFM Report and Order, supra note 199, at 2327 (statement of Comm'r Tristani).
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noted that:
Rampant ownership consolidation has taken place in the radio industry since passage
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Since that time, many Americans have com-
plained that the large media conglomerates fail to serve local communities' interests
and seem to use their local station license as a conduit to air national programming.
Low Power FM was introduced, in part, to respond to such complaints. 2X
In statements of support for LPFM, low power broadcasting is described as
holding the key to localism's proliferation by way of small radio operations
carrying local voices. This rhetoric attempts to legitimize the FCC's controver-
sial move to further populate the broadcast spectrum with signals from non-
commercial, low-power, low-budget stations-a decision resisted by the
broadcast industry, public radio, and many legislators.2 The benefits of local-
ism are cited as justification for LPFM to its staunch opposition and to appeal
to the reform activists and radio enthusiasts who criticize the Commission for
allowing the deterioration of local radio. In these statements, LPFM radio is
the mechanism, and localism is the clear, attainable goal of the service.
By setting parameters for licensee eligibility and broadcast operations by
way of license criteria, the FCC seeks to establish a type of local radio that is
narrow in geographic scope, insular in content, and interactive for listeners. It
is a localism primarily created by a low effective radiated power ("ERP"),
what the FCC refers to as the "local nature of this service." '' An ERP of 100
watts, with an average signal range of 3.5 miles, profoundly narrows the size
of the audience.2 2 The FCC stands by the low ERP, claiming that a larger ser-
vice area could "diminish" what commenters called "the local aspect of LPFM
service."2 3 Intending to contain the communicative experience of LPFM radio
by its management of LPFM's terrestrial signal, the FCC requires licensees to
imagine their audience as limited in size."4
To further cultivate intimacy between licensee and listener, the FCC elected
to demarcate an LPFM station's "community of license" by the anticipated
reach of its signal.2 " The Commission defines an LPFM station's "community"
as "the very small area and population group that will make up the potential
209 150 CONG. REc. 11,556 (2004) (statement of Sen. John McCain).
210 LPFM Report and Order, supra note 199, 1,4, 5, 17.
211 Id. 7, 13, 166.
212 See id. 7, 13, 14,44.
213 Id. 4.
214 For a discussion of how LPFM's structure is reflective of the "reformist" nature of
the service, see JAMES HAMILTON, DEMOCRATIC COMMUNICATIONS: FORMATIONS, PROJECTS,
AND POSSIBILITIES 139-45 (2008).
215 In keeping with the localism doctrine, the FCC requires each broadcast station to
address its community of license, which it defines as "the principal community or other
political subdivision which [the broadcast station] primarily serves." The Commission rec-
ognizes the "geographical station location" as a station's "principal community." See 47
C.F.R. § 73.1120 (2011) (station location).
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service area and audience of an LPFM station."2 6 Put another way, it deter-
mines the community by ERP and transmission coordinates. This is particu-
larly significant considering that this method of defining community is differ-
ent from the approach applied to full power broadcasters. Both commercial and
noncommercial full power FM licensees identify their community of license
using the FCC's Table of Allotments, which the Commission adopted in 1963
following a lengthy rulemaking process and the establishment of a revised
classification scheme for FM stations."7 Alan Stavitsky and Tad Odell explain
that this system of FM licensing allocated signals to communities, "and pro-
spective broadcasters were invited to apply for stations." ' Therefore, when the
FCC assigns a full power FM licensee a particular channel, it also assigns a
specific community of license to the broadcaster." 9
For purposes of this discussion, it is important to note that by not requiring
LPFM applicants to reference the Table of Allotments, the FCC attempts to
instill an organic relationship between the LPFM licensee and the community
of license. Unlike the full power licensee's prearranged relationship between
channel and community, once the LPFM broadcaster has secured approval
from the FCC for its proposed frequency and coordinates of transmission, its
community of license is identified simply as the reach of its signal. The FCC
designs the closest thing to a natural relationship between broadcaster and lis-
teners, rather than treating community as a negotiable condition of a contract,
as it does with full power broadcasting."'
216 LPFM Report and Order, supra note 199, 25 (citations omitted).
217 STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 74, at 414 ("Class A, low power (100 watts to
3,000 watts), and a restriction on antenna height to 300 feet above average terrain leading to
a service radius of about 15 miles, and a distance between stations on the same channel of
65 miles; Class B (5 kw to 50 kw), 500-foot limit, 40-mile service radius, and 150-mile co-
channel spacing; and Class C, high power (25 kw to 100 kw), 65-mile service radius, and
180-mile co-channel spacing. Using these standards, the commission assigned nearly 3,000
potential stations to about 1,800 communities.").
218 Alan G. Stavitsky & Tad Odell, Spectrum Efficiency and Public Interest, 50 J.
BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 692, 693 (2006).
219 While the Table does not recognize every community in the United States and its
territories, current and prospective licensees may petition the FCC to amend the Table by
adding new channels on behalf of unrecognized communities. See In re Revision of Proce-
dures Governing Amendments to FM Table of Allotments and Changes of Community of
License in the Radio Broadcast Services, Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 14,212, 4-6
(Nov. 3, 2006).
220 A full power licensee can apply to change its community of license. Approval of this
request depends on whether the Commission determines that the move is in accordance with
fair allocation objectives. Though this process is not without conflict, it has continued to
exist for as long as the FCC has utilized the Table in licensing decisions. Further, the FCC
has simplified the process by adopting procedures to streamline city of license modifica-
tions, allowing licensees to file for the change with a minor modification application. These
applications may be filed at any time. See id. For a more complete discussion of the pro-
posal to simplify the community of license modification process and the previous, more
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It is the permitted ease with which LPFM licensees serve their community
that is of note here. LPFM licensees are exempt from a number of require-
ments that the FCC imposes on full power licensees, such as meeting technical
standards in covering the predetermined community of license.22' Full power
licensees adhere to the Main Studio Rule-albeit relaxed adherence-which
stipulates that a station's primary studio must be located within "the principal
community contour of any station in any service licensed to the community of
license" or twenty-five miles from the center of the community of license,222
and "be capable of originating and transmitting local programming." '223 Addi-
tionally, full power licensees must maintain a local public inspection file and
make it available for public inspection during business hours. 24 The FCC ex-
plains that it is unnecessary to apply such rules to LPFM licensees, as the ERP
limits render them local in nature.225
Beyond broadcast power, the FCC safeguards the intimacy of LPFM' s local-
ism by designating the service noncommercial. 26 Because increased ratings
mean higher advertising revenue, commercial broadcasters consistently at-
tempt to improve the size of their audience.227 According to the FCC, the ten-
dency to expand coverage interferes with a station's ability to meet the inter-
cumbersome rule making process, see generally In re Revision of Procedures Governing
Amendments to FM Table of Allotments and Changes of Community of License in the Ra-
dio Broadcast Services, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 20 F.C.C.R. 11,169 (June 9,
2005).
221 For commercial licensees, the FCC requires that "a minimum field strength of 70 dB
above one uV/m (dBu), or 3.16 mV/m, will be provided over the entire principal community
to be served," and "the I mV/m contour encompasses the urban population within the area
to be served." See FM Transmitter Location, 47 C.F.R. § 73.315(a), (c) (2010). For non-
commercial licensees, "a minimum field strength of I mV/m (60 dBu) will be provided over
at least 50 percent of its community of license or reach 50 percent of the population within
the community." See NCE FM Transmitter Location, 47 C.F.R. § 73.515 (2011).
222 Station Main Studio Location, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1125(a) (2011); see also David M.
Silverman & David N. Tobenkin, The FCC's Main Studio Rule: Achieving Little for Local-
ism at Great Cost for Broadcasters, 53 FED. CoMM. L.J. 469, 490-491 (2001).
223 See Silverman & Tobenkin, supra note 113, at 486.
224 A commercial radio broadcaster's file must include the following: a copy of the cur-
rent FCC authorization to construct or operate the station, license and renewal application
materials; copies of every citizen agreement; all service contour maps; the most recent own-
ership report; records of broadcasts by political candidates; all written comments by the
public; materials related to FCC investigations or complaints, a copy of the Commission's
educational publication, "The Public and Broadcasting"; time brokerage and joint sales
agreements; and a list of programs of the preceding three months that have addressed com-
munity issues. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526 (2011). A noncommercial licensee's file must in-
clude much of the same with the exception of time brokerage and joint sales agreements. It
also must include a list of donors supporting programs. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3527 (201 1).
225 LPFM Report and Order, supra note 199, ,2.
226 Id. 1, 5, 15-17.
227 Id. 17.
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ests of small community groups.228 In the LPFM Report and Order, the Com-
mission explains, "We are concerned that these commercial incentives could
frustrate achievement of our goal in establishing this service: to foster a pro-
gram service responsive to the needs and interests of small local community
groups, particularly specialized community needs that have not been well
served by commercial broadcast stations. '229
In addition to prohibiting LPFM stations from advertising, the FCC attempts
to squelch the temptation to expand by capping the number of stations a licen-
see can own to one.23 ° These attempts to stifle the broadcaster's inclination to
grow its audience and income are a means of implementing a type of localism
constituted by a small group of participants who are located in the same place.
The rules of prohibition-i.e., a licensee cannot air advertisements or form or
join a network-in conjunction with the limited ERP effectively construct spa-
tial boundaries that limit the actions of LPFM licensees. Clearly, there is a
world beyond signal reach, but, unlike commercial and other noncommercial
licensees with the regulatory capacity to expand coverage, an LPFM licensee
must be content to only serve the original community of license.
These rules effectively limit programming resources, station founders, and
listeners. The FCC states that the local production of programming is the heart
of LPFM's localism."' For a program to originate locally, it must be produced
within ten miles of an LPFM station's transmitting antenna (and within twenty
miles for rural areas).232 Although the FCC does not require a minimum amount
of locally originated programming from LPFM licensees, it uses local origina-
tion as one criterion of a point system in cases of mutual exclusivity. 33
The FCC enforces a "local ownership restriction" requiring that "all LPFM
applicants must be based within [ten] miles of the station they seek to oper-
ate"--the approximated distance traveled by the signal.23 1 "This means that the
applicant must be able to certify that it or its local chapter or branch is physi-
cally headquartered, has a campus, or has 75 percent of its board members re-
siding within [ten] miles of the reference coordinates of the proposed transmit-
228 See id. 9, 17, 26, 29, 33.
229 Id. 17.
230 Id. 26-29.
231 In re Creation of A Low Power Radio Service, Third Report and Order and Second
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R. 21,912, 24 (Nov. 27, 2007) [herein-
after LPFM Third Report and Order] ("[W]e view local origination as a central virtue of the
LPFM service.").
232 Id. 25.
233 When two or more applicants are competing for the same frequency, the FCC as-
sesses which one is most deserving by applying a point to applicants that pledge to air at
least 8 hours of locally originated programming a day. LPFM Report and Order, supra note
199, 144.
234 Id. 33.
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ting antenna. '235 Once again allowing the presumed signal reach determined by
ERP limits to demarcate where local service ends, the FCC deems those resid-
ing within the area of coverage as members of the community. The FCC stated
its "preference for local licensees . . . rests on [the Commission's] predictive
judgment that local entities with their roots in the community will be more at-
tuned and responsive to the needs of that community . *..."236 Thus, the only
acceptable licensees of a local radio station are those who belong to the place.
Invoking the vision of a place-based, homogeneous community,237 the rule op-
erates in accordance with the belief that community members hold a deep un-
derstanding for their community's character. In its most recent revision of the
LPFM rules, the FCC affirms the importance of the local ownership restriction:
"Although growing in both usage and recognition, LPFM service is still in its
nascence and doing away with the locality restriction could threaten its pre-
dominantly local character, in particular the hallmark of a LPFM station's local
character, its local origination of programming." '238 Thus, the FCC hypothesizes
that a radio station composed of people originating from the local place un-
doubtedly generates programming that addresses the needs of the local listen-
ers.
With its set of rules for LPFM radio, the FCC attempts to institute a particu-
lar kind of localism-one that is geographically focused, spatially contained,
and physically present. Interestingly, it is a form of localism that several nota-
ble scholars of media policy describe as nearing obsolescence and in desperate
need of rethinking. Sandra Braman,"9 Andrew Calabrese,24 Philip Napoli,24" '
and Alan Stavitsky242 consider how broadcast regulations intended to promote
localism often do not result in the production of programming that satisfies
local publics, nor do they lead to the creation of meaningful relationships be-
tween station owner and audience. Each claims that a reason for this failure of
intended effects is the changing material and social conditions that affect for-
mations of community.
Sociologists, anthropologists, cultural geographers, and communication
scholars have for many years explored developments in the area of communi-
cation and markets. Many scholars focus on how technological, political, and
235 Id. 33.
236 Id. 34.
237 See GRAHAM DAY, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 1 (2006) (defining community
as "those things which people have in common, which bind them together, and give them a
sense of belonging with one another").
238 LPFM Third Report and Order, supra note 23 1, 24.
239 Braman, supra note 3, at 23 1.
240 Calabrese, supra note 3, at 257.
241 NAPOLI, supra note 2, at 224.
242 See Alan Stavitsky, The Changing Conception of Localism in U.S. Public Radio, 38 J.
BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 19, 21 (1994).
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economic developments of the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries
altered the shape and activities of communities, broadening awareness for, and
enhancing capacity to interact with people around the globe.243 Given the
global movement of people, material, and information, location arguably is no
longer determinative of the community experience. Therefore, it is reasonable
to question the significance of broadcast rules intended to promote communi-
cation for strengthening local bonds. In her article on the localism principle in
communication policy, Braman explicitly makes this point:
Qualitative changes in the nature of society since the early twentieth century and in
the nature of broadcasting over the last few decades weaken the validity of many of
the assumptions that underlie contemporary regulatory approaches. These include
such notions as the idea that the physical presence of a broadcasting station within a
local community ensures that the station provides that community with a meaningful
voice and that local communities continue to be the loci of important political deci-
sions to which local TV discourse might contribute.24
Similarly, in his effort to imagine a broadcast localism accounting for the
technical and social realities of communication that defy spatial boundaries,
Calabrese suggests that localism rules are written to jointly recognize the pres-
ence of geographic and interest based connections as part of the experience of
community.2 45 Maintaining that media policy should continue to promote the
circulation of information among geographically bound communities, it is nec-
essary to acknowledge social connections that are "translocal. ' 42" He explains,
[B]ecause the focus of public life has long been disconnected from specific localities,
a commitment to local participation must not only be a commitment to community life
within specific geographic locales, but also to community life at a grassroots that tran-
scends locale. Any meaningful concept of localism would of course need to reflect
such an understanding of how the local and the translocal are related.247
Napoli echoes this claim when he declares a strictly spatial designation of
community as "no longer sufficient in the new media environment. '2 4' At a
moment when communication technologies continue to expand notions of
community by simultaneously, and paradoxically, challenging and strengthen-
ing geographically situated publics, the cultural relevance of broadcast local-
ism depends on its reinvention through policy.2 49 It is essential that regulations
"reflect the increasing diversity of means by which [political and cultural ex-
243 See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 77 (1990); Joshua Mey-
rowitz, No Sense of Place: The Impact of Electronic Media on Social Behavior, in THE ME-
DIA READER: CONTINUITY AND TRANSFORMATION 99, 100 (Hugh Mackay and Tim
O'Sullivan eds., 1999); DAVID MORLEY, HOME TERRITORIES: MEDIA, MOBILITY AND IDEN-
TITY 3 (2000).
244 Braman, supra note 3, at 234.
245 Calabrese, supra note 3, at 257.
246 Id. at 257.
247 Id. at 257.
248 NAPOLI, supra note 2, at 222.
249 NAPOLI, supra note 2, at 222-24.
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changes] are carried out. 250
Given the dated vision of local community articulated in the LPFM rules, it
is important to question why the service garnered the support of political lead-
ers, citizens, and media experts. One explanation is that the service embodied a
character that is deeply contrary to that of national radio companies pursuing
consolidation."' By criteria deemed to have a "local nature," LPFM stations
are designed to be small, independent stations run by community insiders who
frown upon syndicated programming, and fueled by the charity of the small
populations they reach.2 In essence, the form of radio constructed by the ser-
vice rules is the antithesis of a company like Clear Channel. LPFM's structural
features suit the spectrum, power, and revenue constraints of the broadcast sys-
tem that the FCC confronts in its ongoing effort to preserve the status quo. At
the same time, the structure of LPFM radio appeases critics of consolidated
radio since low power radio resembles the other extreme.253 It is also worth
noting that within the first decade of service, many LPFM stations have con-
fronted numerous challenges in their effort to survive in a system largely com-
prised of advertising- and network-oriented stations .24 Between poor signal
coverage, fundraising difficulties, and understaffed operations, LPFM stations
understand the constraints of being small, and lacking power, as well as inde-
pendent ownership. 5
B. Localism Proceeding
The 2004 Notice of Inquiry on Broadcast Localism identified a number of
topics pertinent to localism, including the rules overseeing television networks
and their affiliates, public files, license renewals, forms of payola, national
radio company practices of voice tracking and assigning national playlists, and
the production of community-responsive programming. 6 Before the release of
the NOI, the Commission opened a docket on "enhanced disclosure," releasing
the Enhanced Disclosure Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 2000,257
250 NAPOLI, supra note 2, at 223.
251 See HILLIARD & KEITH, supra note 1, at 14; Nina Huntemann, A Promise Diminished:
The Politics of Low Power Radio, in COMMUNITIES OF THE AIR 76, 76 (Susan Squier
ed., 2003); KLINENBERG, supra note 26, at 278-79; Keith Brand, The Rebirth of Low-power
FM Broadcasting in the U.S., 11 J. RADIO STUD. 153 (2004); Martin, supra note 196; Cyn-
thia Conti, Low-Power Broadcasting in the U.S.: Rules and Practices of Localism 3-4, 15
(2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with author).
252 See Conti, supra note 25 1, at 77.
253 See 150 CONG. REc. 11,556 (2004) (statement of Sen. John McCain).
254 See Conti, supra note 251, at 214-15, 219.
255 See id. 214-15.
256 See Broadcast Localism NOI, supra note 21, 30-45.
257 In re Standardized and Enhanced Disclosure Requirements for Television Broadcast
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[Wihich proposed to replace the issues/programs lists with standardized form. The
proposed form asks broadcasters to report on their efforts to identify the programming
needs of various segments of their communities, and list their community-responsive
programming by category. The Enhanced Disclosure NPRM also proposed that
broadcasters make these forms, as well as the rest of their public inspection files,
available on the Internet, and sought comment on a proposal to encourage stations to
use their websites to conduct online discussions and facilitate interaction with the pub-
lic. 2
58
This proposal would revise the contents of the public inspection file in order
to make it both easier for licensees to report on their community service pro-
gramming, and for viewers to evaluate the work of their television broadcast-
ers. 21 When evaluated alongside other issues the FCC identified as matters of
localism, the endurance of the enhanced disclosure proposal is noteworthy.
Three and a half years after the NOI, the FCC listed enhanced disclosure as a
top priority in the combined Broadcast Localism Report and NPRM.26
Related to enhanced disclosure, the FCC also articulated a firm commitment
to update The Public and Broadcasting, which is a document that educates the
public on the service obligations of local broadcasters. 6' Even though the
Commission looks to the public to assist in evaluating the performance of
broadcasters, often both listeners and viewers are unaware of the duties of li-
censees. In the 2008 NPRM, the FCC states that through The Public and
Broadcasting, it intends to "provide an effective means by which to inform
members of the public of the specific obligations of the stations that are li-
censed to serve them, and the various operating rules with which licensees
must comply." '262 Several months later, the FCC released the updated version of
The Public and Broadcasting guide. Its contents include an explanation of the
broadcast licensing system and the FCC's role within it, general principles of
broadcast content regulation, rules around different types of programming and
advertising, and a description of the required contents of the local public in-
spection file.263 The guide encourages members of the public to voice their
concerns regarding a broadcast station's performance; first, to station man-
agement and then, if necessary, to the FCC if they "feel the need to do so."264
The guide explains that an audience member may also file a "petition to deny"
Licensee Public Interest Obligations, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 15 F.C.C.R. 19,816
(Sept. 14, 2000).
258 Broadcast Localism NOI, supra note 21, 10.
259 Id. 3-4,9.
260 Id. 12.
261 Broadcast Localism Report & NPRM, supra note 22, 15-19.
262 Id. 18.
263 See generally FCC, THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING: How TO GET THE MOST SER-
VICE FROM YOUR LOCAL STATION (July 2008), available at http://commcns.org/l0C9xQW.
264 Id. at 32.
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or an "informal objection" to a license renewal application.265 In addition to
using the information provided on the Commission's website regarding the
process, an individual may also contact a "broadcast information specialist" to
have his or her questions answered directly."'
In addition to delineating enhanced disclosures and the release of an updated
guide, the 2008 Broadcast Localism Report & NPRM requested comments on
several proposals: 1) the mandated convention of permanent advisory boards
consisting of representatives from the service area;267 2) the requirement of
twenty-four hour presence at each broadcasting facility;268 3) the requirement
of some amount of locally-oriented programming. 69 If enforced, each of these
proposals would have required greater action and resources from broadcasters
in their efforts to serve the public. Following the comment period, public inter-
est groups in favor of the proposed stricter localism rules awaited the FCC's
announcement of its decisions.
In July 2011, the FCC heard from the Working Group on Information Needs
of Communities ("INC") regarding the matter. Founded at the announcement
of the FCC's "Future of Media" proceeding in 2010, and headed by Steven
Waldman, the INC advised the FCC to drop the localism proceeding in its re-
port, The Information Needs of Communities: The Changing Media Landscape
in a Broadband Age.27 The report praises the Commission for its efforts to-
wards required disclosure, and echoes an aspiration first mentioned by Pow-
ell's Commission-that the public file should be made accessible online-
adding that it should eventually become an exclusively online document.27" '
However, the report states that other potential efforts in the name of localism
would amount to wasted resources:
[T]he Commission should terminate the "localism "proceeding and withdraw the lo-
calism [NPRM]. While the existing NPRM attempts to advance the worthwhile goal
of promoting local media-an aspiration of many of the recommendations in this re-
port-that particular rulemaking includes several unworkable or unnecessarily bur-
densome ideas, such as a requirement that all stations have around-the-clock staff-
ing.
272
Though the FCC has not formally announced an abandonment of the local-
ism proceeding, it has yet to pursue most of its proposals in the 2008 Broad-
265 Id. at 11.
266 Id. at 33.
267 Broadcast Localism Report & NPRM, supra note 22, 26, 43-44, 73.
268 Id. 17, 87, 111.
269 Id. 40, 124.
270 STEVEN WALDMAN, FCC, THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES: THE CHANGING
MEDIA LANDSCAPE IN A BROADBAND AGE 29 (July 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/Lfslbl.
271 Id. at 346-47.
272 Id. at 347.
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cast Localism Report & NPRM, with the notable exception of the Standardized
Online Disclosure requirement for full power television broadcast licensees.273
Seven years after the release of the Enhanced Disclosure NPRM, the FCC
adopted a Report and Order in the proceeding, "requiring television broadcast-
ers to replace their issues/programs lists with Standardized Television Disclo-
sure Form 355 and to post the completed forms online."274 The Commission's
reasoning behind the introduction of the form was to "facilitate access to the
issues/program information," resulting in greater accountability on the part of
broadcasters to their local audiences.275 True to form, debate over the purpose
and usefulness of a standard form ensued, with industry petitioners describing
the form as "vague, overly complex, and burdensome" and public interest ad-
vocates calling for revisions that would enhance the details disclosed by broad-
casters. 76 In both cases, the parties made characteristic claims regarding the
introduction of a new rule (i.e., the scope of the rule was either overbroad or
not broad enough).
Beyond calling for stricter disclosure requirements, the comments of public
interest advocates on Standardized Television Disclosure Form 355 depict a
strategic development in the effort to reform the broadcast system.277 Advo-
cates claimed that the enhanced disclosure form should be "designed to facili-
tate the downloading and aggregation of data for researchers.""27 It is worth
noting that an alliance of public interest groups, collectively identified as the
Public Interest Public Airwaves Coalition ("PIPAC"),279 made the same request
following the release of the report produced by INC as a follow-up to the
working group's recommendations.28 In a letter to Chairman Julius Gena-
273 Drew Simshaw, Note, Survival of the Standard: Today's Public Interest Requirement
in Television Broadcasting and the Return to Regulation, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 401, 413-415
(2011). However, the requirement was vacated in 2011. In re Standardized and Enhanced
Disclosure Requirements for Television Broadcast Licensee Public Interest Obligations;
Extension of the Filing Requirement for Children's Television Programming Report (FCC
Form 398), Order on Reconsideration and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26
F.C.C.R. 15, 788, 1 (Oct. 27, 2011) (vacating In re Matter of Standardized and Enhanced
Disclosure Requirements for Television Broadcast Licensee Public Interest Obligations,
Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 1274 (Nov. 27,2007)).
274 In re Standardized Program Reporting Requirements for Broadcast Licensees, Notice
of Inquiry, 26 F.C.C.R. 16,525, 5 (Nov. 10, 2011).
275 Id. 4.
276 Id. 6.
277 Id. 6, 11.
278 Id. 6.
279 The Coalition includes the Benton Foundation, Campaign Legal Center, Common
Cause, Free Press, Media Access Project, New America Foundation, and the Office of
Communication, Inc. of the United Church of Christ. See Public Interest Public Airwaves
Coalition Opposition to Stay of FCC Disclosure Rules, FREEPREsS (July 20, 2012),
http://commcns.org/WiV4ma.
280 In re Standardized and Enhanced Disclosure Requirements for Television Broadcast
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chowski on Information Needs of Communities, PIPAC claims that enhanced
disclosures increases "the transparency and quality of information submitted
by broadcast licensees.28" ' A database containing reported information should be
made available to the public so that "[m]embers of the public and researchers
alike [are] able to download the data in raw form in its entirety to compare sta-
tions or perform other analyses.""2 2
The recommendations of public interest advocates propose a method of
monitoring the service of broadcast licensees that deviates from the traditional
method, where much of the burden of monitoring local broadcasters is placed
on the community of license. In an arrangement established by the Communi-
cation Act of 1934, the audience served by the trustees of the airwaves also
monitors them. When members of the public believe that a licensee fails to
meet its service responsibilities, they have options for recourse, such as filing a
"petition to deny" that the Commission will consider at the time of license re-
newal.2"3 The FCC relies on members of the audience to police the content on
the airwaves and the service of local broadcasters. Thus, the logic of the public
trustee system leads to the assumption that members of the community of li-
cense will utilize a database containing information reported by local broad-
casters to stay abreast of licensees' service efforts. While not speaking directly
on this arrangement, PIPAC's comments on enhanced disclosure introduce its
coalition members as another audience for disclosed information. Moreover,
by noting that the purpose of the database is to provide data for comparative
analysis, the coalition indicates that its members may be the primary users of
Licensee Public Interest Obligations, Comments of the Public Interest Public Airwaves Coa-
lition, FCC 11-19, MM Docket No. 00-168, at 1, 16, 19, 22, 25-26 (December 22, 2011).
281 Letter from PIPAC to Julius Genachowski, Chariman, FCC 1 (Aug. 4, 2011) (on file
with Commlaw Conspectus), available at http://commcns.orgNa2 IKE.
282 Id. at 2.
283 Of course, licensees' public service responsibilities, mandated by the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, opened the door for the FCC's consideration of public feedback on li-
cense renewal decisions. Yet, it is worth noting that the practice of filing a "petition to
deny" took hold following the FCC's decision to renew the license of station WLBT in
Jackson, Mississippi. Over the course of a decade, residents of Jackson, along with the Jack-
son chapter of the NAACP, petitioned the FCC to cease renewal of the license belonging to
a local affiliate that would not air programs featuring African-Americans or any coverage of
civil rights activism. The basis of their complaint was the station's failure to address the
informational needs of the community by avoiding coverage of political events. Though the
FCC rejected the petition, in 1966 the Court of Appeals reversed the FCC's decision to re-
new in Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, deciding that citi-
zens should have a role in the renewal process because it is their interest that broadcasters
are mandated to serve. See Office of Commc'n of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359
F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1966). "In the aftermath of UCC v. FCC, citizens' groups filed
'petitions to deny' the license renewal applications of existing broadcasters. The public
interest groups argued that the licensees had not lived up to various aspects of their public
interest obligations." HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 247-48.
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the system. Given it is unlikely that viewers will use public file information to
perform comparative analysis, PIPAC discloses itself as the party best served
by the proposed requirement.284 With this justification for online disclosure,
PIPAC repositions the proposed requirement as part of a revised notion for
overseeing localism in United States broadcasting. The online disclosure re-
quirement alters the traditional conception of the cycle of local programming,
powered by two parties-local broadcaster and local audience-and makes a
place for public interest groups within this dynamic.
Effective August 2, 2012, the FCC now requires that television licensees
post their public files online in a Commission-hosted database, which includes
the formerly required staples, such as a biennial ownership reports, license re-
newal applications, and Quarterly Issues Programs lists. 285 On one hand, these
enhanced disclosures are the FCC's makeover of an old pursuit, conforming to
the logic of the public trustee system instituted by the Communications Act of
1934. A pursuit of the localism initiative's enhanced disclosure is expected to
improve upon this longstanding system by updating the informational materials
that aid the public in the evaluation of broadcasters. 286 As such, it is a recogniz-
able, yet slightly revised, part of the original system.
When analyzed from this perspective, the continued relevance of a particular
ideal becomes clear: the invested local audience as a predominant theme in
American broadcast localism. In the United States system, the largely unques-
tioned presumption that an audience desires local service justifies the promo-
tion of the localism principle. Like a democracy's "informed citizen, 287 this
system is built on local audiences who tune in, hold awareness of their inter-
ests, and act to preserve them. Out of several possibilities for reform named
during the localism proceeding, the FCC decided to pursue those that rein-
forced a "localism" characterized not by the content of broadcasters, but by the
presence and investment of the community.288 Certainly, the hegemonic status
of the invested community in American broadcasting and democratic govem-
ment makes this a safe pursuit for the FCC. By enhancing disclosure and revis-
ing the public guide, steps taken in an effort to increase the potential for audi-
ence knowledge, the FCC followed tradition in ideology and mechanism. In
addition to preserving the status quo, this conception of localism speaks to the
284 Letter from PIPAC to Julius Genachowski, supra note 281, at 2.
285 In re Standardized and Enhanced Disclosure Requirements for Television Broadcast
Licensee Public Interest Obligations; Extension of the Filing Requirement for Children's
Television Programming Report (FCC Form 398), Second Report and Order, 27 F.C.C.R.
4535, 1, 12-18 (Apr.27, 2012) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526(b)).
286 See WALDMAN, supra note 270, at 7-9, 15-16, 122, 208-09.
287 See generally SCHUDSON, supra note 47.
288 See, e.g., LPFM Third Report and Order, supra note 231, 21-25 (reinstating local
ownership restrictions for LPFM licensees).
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beliefs of reform advocates who doubt the FCC's record for public interest
protection. In this case, the FCC's pursuits reference the trope of an engaged
and hungry local audience, which underlies opposition to consolidation.
However, if one considers the primary audience for public files to be public
interest groups, the disclosure requirement can be interpreted as holding a dif-
ferent significance. In the current media environment defined by mergers,
complex ownership arrangements, and innumerable outlets, the citizens that
constitute communities of license are not prepared to be the watchdog. It is
therefore up to organized and established public interest groups, composed of
policy experts, lawyers, and researchers, to assume this role. In the reformist
conception of United States broadcasting, the FCC must allow experts from the
media reform community to interject. What's more, online disclosure provides
access to information that will aid the media reform movement's broad mission
of structural transformation through policy change. In the complex battle be-
tween public interest groups and the broadcast industry, "localism"--in this
case, materializing in the form of enhanced disclosure-is not simply the ob-
jective, but also the weapon. As part of this scheme, the ideal of the engaged
local audience is vacated and replaced by an audience of policy experts at na-
tional organizations, thus disrupting the traditional understanding of the local
programming cycle. Though originally understood as a mechanism to
strengthen localism, the disclosure rule is more accurately interpreted as hav-
ing a multidimensional purpose.
V. CONCLUSION
A consideration of the different conceptions of localism constitutes a unique
analytic position on localism policy. It is clear that, in the aftermath of the
Telecommunications Act, the FCC moved to quiet critics of consolidation by
pursuing actions that would arguably revive broadcast localism. Analysis that
questions the FCC-promoted character of localism on a case-by-case basis
yields evidence that challenges the claim that, with certain actions, the FCC
either establishes or enforces a mandated standard that has existed since the
beginning of regulated broadcasting. By analyzing, instead, which character of
localism is promoted by a particular rule, the focus becomes the political and
social value of the principle given the context into which it is introduced.
Rather than viewing localism as a standard that is in need of safeguarding or
rethinking, this position takes localism's mutability as a benign condition of
the principle. Similarly, rather than assessing the successes and failures of a
rule in meeting particular criteria, one's analytic aspirations are to identify the
cultural interests that motivate the use of localism as a justification for policy
and interpret the shape of the principle called upon to satisfy the wants of the
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situation. Such an analytic position is concerned with recognizing the tremen-
dously varied conceptions of the value of localism.
During the period following widespread media consolidation, the FCC con-
fronted public discontent over the loss of locally owned and produced media. 89
While on the surface it seems the FCC responded to complaints by instituting
rules which sought to restore what members of the public perceived as lost,
exploration of the forms of localism promoted by the rules elucidates specific
cultural and political tensions surrounding local broadcasting. With the estab-
lishment of LPFM service, the enhanced disclosure requirement, and the re-
lease of the revised informational guide regarding what is required of licen-
sees, the FCC appears to promote the ideal of the small, intimate, engaged, and
active community.2" Referencing the vision of local community described in
works of democratic theory, the FCC's pursuits address a particular kind of
audience-one that is defined by a shared identity originating from its small
place-based community, and willing to act in order to ensure they receive the
information needed to develop politically and culturally. By considering the
anticipated function of LPFM, enhanced disclosure, and revised guide, as well
as the anticipated context they are intended to function within, it becomes clear
that the Commission's post-1996 efforts in support of localism reflect a mythic
notion of local community engagement. In addition to posturing as a manage-
able forum for participatory democracy, the FCC presents broadcasting as one
remedy for the general "bigness" of media that scholars name as a highly de-
tested outcome of the Telecommunications Act.29" '
Notwithstanding, an examination of the comments regarding enhanced dis-
closure depicts a more complicated story in which localism is, on one hand,
suggested to be the aforementioned ideal of community autonomy, and on the
other, acknowledged to be a myth. This observation derives from an analytic
position that recognizes localism's mutability and, therefore, prioritizes aware-
ness of complex policy and localism goals. It is worth questioning which con-
ception of localism motivates each rule proposals suggested in its name.
Through this exercise, it is possible to disentangle rhetoric from rule and de-
velop an approach to advancing localism that directly addresses the character
of this complicated principle.
289 See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 381-82 (3d Cir. 2004) (question-
ing the Commission's statutory authority to significantly relax restrictions on consolidated
media); Free Press Quadrennial Review Comments, supra note 9, at 3.
290 See Braman, supra note 3, 277-78.
291 See WRIGHT, supra note 11, at 3; see generally ROBERT MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA,
POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES (1999).
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